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Abstract
We develop a monopolistic competition model of trade and multinational production
(MP). Firms receive an idiosyncratic vector of productivities for di⁄erent locations from
a multivariate distribution. They also face distance related trade and MP costs. Thus,
individual ￿rms face a proximity￿ versus￿ comparative advantage trade-o⁄ to serve in-
dividual locations from close-by or high productivity locations. The model gives simple
structural expressions for bilateral trade and MP. We use these expressions to calibrate
the model across a set of OECD countries. We quantify the implications of openness to
trade and MP on the allocation of employment between production and innovation, as
well as the implications for wages, pro￿ts and overall welfare.
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Titelnot, as well as seminar participants at Arizona State University, Boston University, the Cowles Foundation,
MIT, Penn State, Princeton, Stanford, University of Oregon, and Yale for insightful comments. We also thank
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for support. All remaining errors are our own. The statistical analysis of ￿rm-level data on U.S. multinational
corporations reported in this study was conducted at the International Investment Division, U.S. Bureau of
Economic Analysis, under arrangements that maintained legal con￿dentiality requirements. Views expressed
are those of the authors and do not necessarily re￿ ect those of the Bureau of Economic Analysis. This paper
previously circulated under the title: ￿Proximity versus Comparative Advantage: A Quantitative Theory of
Trade and Multinational Production￿ .1 Introduction
A fundamental feature of ￿globalization￿is the increasing geographic separation between inno-
vation and production. With the rapid growth of multinational production (MP), it is increas-
ingly likely that knowledge developed by a ￿rm in one country will be exploited in production
facilities scattered throughout the globe.1 Together with the growth of MP has come a public
uneasiness as to its impact on welfare. Multinational ￿rms are frequently accused of ￿ship-
ping jobs overseas,￿thereby bene￿tting their host countries at the expense of workers in the
home country. However, this discussion typically abstracts from the fact that foreign a¢ liates
generate pro￿ts abroad and induce greater innovation in the source country.2
Understanding the interaction of these di⁄erent forces and how they together a⁄ect welfare
requires careful general equilibrium analysis. This paper develops a quantitative multi-country
general equilibrium model in which the location of innovation and production is endogenous
and geographically separable. We build on the established theory of international trade by
relaxing the assumption that production occurs in the same country where the ￿rms and ideas
are created.
Formally, we model innovation as the creation of heterogenous ￿rms that sell di⁄erentiated
goods in monopolistically competitive markets.3 We depart from Melitz (2003) by assuming
that ￿rms can locate production outside of their home market with the productivity levels
across locations drawn from a multivariate distribution. In deciding where to produce to serve
a particular market, ￿rms face a ￿proximity-comparative advantage trade-o⁄.￿On the one hand,
￿rms want to be close to their customers to avoid trade costs; on the other hand, they want to
produce in the country where they would achieve the minimum unit cost, i.e., the country that
has a comparative advantage in production for this particular ￿rm.
By allowing ￿rms to produce outside of their home country, multinational production leads
some countries to specialize in innovation and others to specialize in production.4 Countries that
1As of 2004, over 65 percent of U.S.-based manufacturing ￿rms sales abroad are due not to exports from
the United States but to the foreign a¢ liates of these ￿rms. Further, almost one-￿fth of U.S. exports can be
attributed to the a¢ liates of foreign ￿rms operating in the United States.
2Indeed, in the case of Ireland, a popular host country for MP, the pro￿ts earned by the a¢ liates of foreign
multinationals account for as much as 20 percent of Irish GDP.
3This is what is commonly referred to as ￿entry￿in the context of the Melitz (2003) model.
4In the absence of multinational production, the share of labor devoted to innovation would be the same in
all countries. This is consistent with the version of the Melitz/Chaney model presented in Arkolakis, Demidova,
1specialize in innovation have a net in￿ ow of pro￿ts that compensates for the cost of innovation
and allows them to run a trade de￿cit. Loosely speaking, these countries export ideas and
import goods.
There are two forces that determine the geographic allocation of innovation: ￿rst, countries
that have a high productivity in innovation relative to production will tend to specialize in inno-
vation, and second, home market e⁄ects (HME) imply that country size and location matter for
the allocation of production and innovation ￿in particular, home market e⁄ects lead production
to concentrate in countries with large ￿market potential￿while they draw innovation towards
countries with large ￿production potential￿(i.e., countries that have a large labor force or that
are well connected to such countries). We can think of the ￿rst of these forces as ￿compara-
tive advantage in innovation￿while the second force is related to proximity to consumers (for
production) and workers (for innovation). This is another sense in which our model exhibits a
proximity-comparative advantage trade-o⁄ ￿in this case, however, the trade-o⁄ takes place at
the aggregate rather than the ￿rm level, and operates through general equilibrium forces.
One of the issues that we explore with our model regards the e⁄ect of MP on real wages.
We ￿rst consider a version of our model with exogenous innovation, i.e., the measure of ￿rms
in each country is exogenous and the free-entry condition is ignored. In this case, we show that
under certain parameter values, MP may actually hurt workers in countries endowed with a
high ratio of ￿rms to workers. The reason why MP may hurt workers is intuitive and resonates
with the popular discussion about this issue: MP makes it feasible for ￿rms to produce outside
of their home country, and this e⁄ectively generates competition for home-country workers.
This negative e⁄ect of MP on real wages critically depends on the assumption that innovation
is exogenous. In the full model with endogenous innovation we ￿nd that this negative e⁄ect
of MP on workers is no longer present. The reason is simple: with endogenous innovation, a
decline in MP frictions leads countries with a comparative advantage in innovation to reallocate
workers from production to innovation. This reallocation bene￿ts workers by increasing the
measure of national ￿rms and by reducing the size of the production sector, thereby improving
the country￿ s terms of trade.5
Klenow, and Rodr￿guez-Clare (2008), where entry is endogenous but not a⁄ected by trade costs. An equivalent
result is derived in a setting with Bertrand competition in Eaton and Kortum (2001).
5The result that under exogenous innovation MP can hurt workers in advanced countries while this is no
2We calibrate the model to match trade and MP ￿ ows and then use the calibrated model
to address a series of questions. How does a general decline in trade and MP costs a⁄ect the
location of innovation, and what are the implications for relative and real wages in di⁄erent
countries? In particular, does MP hurt workers in countries that have a comparative advantage
in innovation? How does a unilateral change in trade or MP costs for one country a⁄ect not
only that country but also its neighbors? How much do di⁄erent countries gain from trade and
MP? At this point, our quantitative results are very preliminary, so we will not describe them
here at length ￿su¢ ce it to say for now that our results suggest that even with exogenous
innovation, a decline in MP frictions does not hurt workers in rich countries.
The mechanisms at work in our model have antecedents in the classic work on trade and
MP (see Markusen (2002) ). This literature highlights at least four key ideas: (1) MP allows
innovation (entry) to be geographically separated from production, (2) countries may di⁄er
in their relative costs in innovation and production, which leads to a tendency toward some
specialization in one of these two activities (3) the non-rivalry of technology within the ￿rm
allows multi-plant production, and (4) trade costs encourage while MP costs discourage multi-
plant production. The incorporation of these features into general equilibrium trade models
dates back to Helpman (1984) and Markusen (1984). Helpman (1984) focuses on motivations for
the geographic separation of innovation and production, while Markusen (1984) focuses on the
motivation for and welfare implications of multi-plant production.6 By simplifying comparative
advantage to a probabilistic setting and by replacing plant-level ￿xed costs with marketing ￿xed
costs, we gain the ability to construct a tractable and quanti￿able, multi-country model that
incorporates the most important mechanisms found in this earlier work.
Our model provides a strict generalization of the Melitz (2003)-Chaney (2008) model of
trade. In particular, when MP costs go to in￿nity, our model collapses to a general equilib-
rium version of that model with endogenous entry (as in Arkolakis, Demidova, Klenow, and
longer possible under endogenous innovation is similar to the results in Rodriguez-Clare (2010) in the context
of a model of trade and o⁄shoring.
6Examples of work that most closely resembles our own are Markusen and Venables (1998) and Markusen
and Venables (2000) in which the authors analyze the interaction between comparative advantage in production
and innovation, trade costs, and plant and corporate ￿xed costs in a two-country, Heckscher-Ohlin-like setting.
Grossman and Helpman (1991) extend this framework to an endogenous growth setting in which the more
e¢ cient use of the world￿ s resources made possible by MP may a⁄ect the long run growth rate in rich and poor
countries.
3Rodr￿guez-Clare (2008)). Another strict generalization of the Melitz-Chaney model to allow for
MP is Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple (2004) (henceforth HMY). Our approach has signi￿cant
di⁄erences with HMY. First, we allow for comparative advantage in innovation so that some
countries specialize in innovation and exhibit net outward MP while others specialize in pro-
duction and exhibit net inward MP. Second, by considering a general equilibrium model we can
study the role of home market e⁄ects on the geography of innovation and production. Third,
our model easily accommodates the possibility that multinational a¢ liates may use some pro-
duction locations as export platforms to other countries, while this possibility leads to severe
computational problems in HMY.7
One potential drawback of our approach relative to HMY (and the quantitative application
of their framework by Irarrazabal, Moxnes, and Opromolla (2009)) is that we do not allow for
￿xed costs of running foreign a¢ liates. Thus, our model does not have a proximity-concentration
trade-o⁄. This simpli￿cation allows us to avoid a very complex discrete choice problem and buys
us the tractability to handle export platforms. It is important to note that some of the key
implications of the proximity-concentration trade-o⁄ appear in our model through alternative
mechanisms. For instance, our model is consistent with large ￿rms having more a¢ liates ￿
larger ￿rms serve more markets, and this leads them to open more a¢ liates to avoid trade
costs.
A close relative to our model is Ramondo and Rodr￿guez-Clare (2009), which extends the
perfect competition Ricardian framework of Eaton and Kortum (2002) to allow for MP. Whereas
both models have similar predictions regarding aggregate trade and MP ￿ ows, the counterfactu-
als are di⁄erent because our model takes into account the e⁄ect of trade and MP costs on pro￿ts
(under exogenous innovation) or the location of innovation (under endogenous innovation). This
leads to important di⁄erences in the welfare implications of trade or MP liberalization.
Our model is also related to Prescott and McGrattan (2010) and McGrattan (2011). These
papers extend the neoclassical growth model by introducing a non-rival ￿knowledge capital￿
that can be used in any location. The use of knowledge capital accumulated in one country
to produce in another country is interpreted as MP while trade takes place only as a way to
7For example Irarrazabal, Moxnes, and Opromolla (2009) develop the ￿rst multi-country calibration of the
HMY model and they are forced to ignore export platform MP. They are also forced to introduce bilateral
constraints in terms of the wages and trade costs to be able to solve the model. Our approach is more amenable
to calibration and this allows us to conduct a series of general equilibrium counterfactual exercises.
4transfer the returns to capital. We think of our approaches as complementary: while our model
can more easily connect to the trade and MP data, the McGrattan and Prescott approach allows
for an analysis of the transition path as countries open up to MP.
Finally, Eaton and Kortum (2007) explore similar issues as those in this paper in the context
of a two country model with endogenous innovation and Bertrand competition. In particular,
they allow for di⁄usion of ideas so that innovators in one country can use their ideas for pro-
duction in the other country. Di⁄usion in their model a⁄ects specialization in innovation in a
way analogous to what MP a⁄ects specialization in our setup. By allowing for heterogenous
productivities for each ￿rm in di⁄erent locations, we avoid the Ricardian-type discontinuities
that lead to a multiplicity of cases in Eaton and Kortum (2007), and in that way extend the
model to multiple countries and connect it to trade and MP data.
2 The Model
We now describe the details of our proximity￿ versus￿ comparative advantage model. As in Melitz
(2003), a continuum of ￿rms produce di⁄erentiated goods under monopolistic competition and
decide whether to pay a ￿xed marketing cost to serve each particular market. We extend this
model by allowing each ￿rm to produce anywhere in the world, albeit at varying productivity
levels. Faced with costs of exporting and with costs of producing outside of its home market,
each ￿rm decides which markets to serve and where to locate production to serve those markets.
Our choice for the functional form of the distribution from which ￿rms draw their productivity
upon entry leads to a parsimonious characterization of ￿rm choices and aggregate trade and
MP ￿ ows.
2.1 The Environment
We consider a world economy comprising of i = 1;:::;N countries; one factor of production,
labor; and a continuum of goods indexed by ! 2 ￿. Labor is inelastically supplied and immobile
across countries. Let Li and wi denote the total endowment of labor and the wage in country
i, respectively. In each country i, there is a representative agent with Dixit-Stiglitz preferences
5with elasticity of substitution ￿ > 1. The associated price index is given by
Pi =
￿Z
!2￿
pi(!)
1￿￿d!
￿ 1
1￿￿
, (1)
where pi(!) is the price of good !. We adopt the convention that pi (!) = +1 if good ! is not
available in country i.
Each good ! is potentially produced by a single ￿rm under monopolistic competition. To
the extent possible, we use index i to denote the ￿rm￿ s country of origin (the source of the
idea), index l to denote the location of production, and index n to denote the country where
the ￿rm sells its product. A ￿rm from country i can serve country n by (a) producing in
i and exporting to country n, by (b) opening an a¢ liate in country l 6= i;n and exporting
from there to country n, or by (c) opening an a¢ liate in n and selling the good domestically.
Firms use constant returns to scale technologies, with the marginal product of labor being
￿rm speci￿c and location speci￿c. In particular, a ￿rm is distinguished by a productivity vector
z = (z1;z2;:::;zN). Here zl determines the ￿rm￿ s productivity if it decides to produce in country
l, as explained below.
Firms from l that sell in country n incur a ￿marketing￿￿xed cost wnFn and an ￿iceberg￿
transportation cost of ￿ln ￿ 1. We assume that ￿nn = 1 and that the triangular inequality
holds (i.e., ￿il￿ln ￿ ￿in). Moreover, we assume the existence of bilateral ￿iceberg￿multinational
production (MP) costs ￿il ￿ 1 with ￿ll = 1. Letting ￿iln ￿ ￿ilwl￿ln, these assumptions imply
that a ￿rm from i producing in location l in order to serve market n has unit cost Ciln ￿ ￿iln=zl
and a ￿xed cost of wnFn. Note that all heterogeneity across ￿rms is associated with di⁄erences
in the productivity vector z, while the trade and MP costs f￿lng and f￿ilg as well as wages
(and hence ￿iln) is common across ￿rms.
The productivity vector of ￿rms in country i is randomly assigned according to the multi-
variate distribution given by
Pr(Z1 ￿ z1;:::;ZN ￿ zN) = Gi(z1;:::;zN) = 1 ￿
 
N X
l=1
￿
Tilz
￿￿
l
￿ 1
1￿￿
!1￿￿
(2)
6with support zl ￿ e T
1=￿
i for all l, where e Ti ￿
hP
l T
1=(1￿￿)
il
i1￿￿
, ￿ 2 [0;1), and ￿ > ￿￿1.8 Several
comments are in order. First, the marginals have conditional distributions that are Pareto. In
particular,
Pr(Zl ￿ zl) = lim
x!1Gi(x;:::;zl;:::;x) = 1 ￿ Tilz
￿￿
l ;
so for zl ￿ a > e T
1=￿
i we have
Pr(Zl ￿ zl j Zl ￿ a) = (zl=a)
￿￿:
Second, in the limit as ￿ ! 1 we have Gi(z1;:::;zN) = 1￿maxl Tilz
￿￿
l .9 In this case, the elements
of z are perfectly correlated. Finally, if ￿ = 0, then for l 6= k we have Pr(Zl > e T
1=￿
i \ Zk >
e T
1=￿
i ) = 0, and Pr(Zl ￿ zl \ Zk = e T
1=￿
i for all k 6= l) =
￿
Til=e Ti
￿￿
1 ￿ e Tiz
￿￿
l
￿
.10 This case is
equivalent to simply having the production location l chosen randomly with probabilities Til=e Ti
among all possible locations i = 1;:::;N, and then the productivity Zi chosen from the Pareto
distribution 1 ￿ e Tiz
￿￿
l with zl ￿ e T
1=￿
i . Figures 1 and 2 illustrate how the distribution depends
on the value of ￿.
In the rest of the paper we make the following assumption:
Assumption 1 Til = T e
i T
p
l and
P
l (T
p
l )
1=(1￿￿) = 1.
This assumption implies that e Ti =
hP
l T
1=(1￿￿)
il
i1￿￿
= T e
i , so we can think of T e
i as a measure
of the quality of ideas in country i, or productivity in innovation. In turn, T
p
l determines
8This distribution can be seen as a reformulation of an Archimedean copula of Pareto distributions. Consider
the copula C(x1;x2) ￿ max
￿
1 ￿
h
(1 ￿ x1)
1
1￿￿ + (1 ￿ x2)
1
1￿￿
i1￿￿￿
. This is copula 4.2.2 in Nielsen (2006).
If z1 and z2 are distributed Pareto with zl ￿ 1 ￿ Tlz
￿￿
l , then the previous copula leads to distribution
G(z1;z2) = max
￿
1 ￿
h
(T1z
￿￿
1 )
1
1￿￿ + (T2z
￿￿
2 )
1
1￿￿
i1￿￿
;0
￿
. The support of this distribution is implicitly de-
￿ned by (T1z
￿￿
1 )
1
1￿￿ + (T2z
￿￿
2 )
1
1￿￿ ￿ 1. This distribution cannot be directly extended to N ￿ 3 because the
copula is not strict (see Nelsen, 2006). Instead, we modify the support of the distribution to make it an N-box
de￿ned by zl ￿ e T
1=￿
i for all l.
9Let x ￿ maxl Tilz
￿￿
l and note that Gi(z1;:::;zN) = 1 ￿ x
￿
PN
l=1
h
Tilz
￿￿
l
x
i 1
1￿￿
￿1￿￿
: As ￿ ! 1 then
h
Tilz
￿￿
l
x
i 1
1￿￿
! 0 for all l except v ￿ argmaxl Tilz
￿￿
l , for which
h
Tivz
￿￿
v
x
i 1
1￿￿
= 1 for all ￿, so
PN
l=1
h
Tilz
￿￿
l
x
i 1
1￿￿
!
1 and hence Gi(z1;:::;zN) ! 1 ￿ maxl Tilz
￿￿
l .
10To see this, note that with ￿ = 0 the density associated with the distribution above is zero if it is
evaluated at a point with Zv > e T
1=￿
i for two or more v, while Pr(Zl ￿ zl \ Zk = e T
1=￿
i for all k 6= l) =
1 ￿
hPN
k6=l Tik=e Ti + Tilz
￿￿
l
i
, and this is equal to
￿
Til=e Ti
￿￿
1 ￿ e Tiz
￿￿
l
￿
.
7Figure 1: Simulation for 10,000 draws from 1 ￿
￿￿
T1z
￿￿
1
￿ 1
1￿￿ +
￿
T2z
￿￿
2
￿ 1
1￿￿
￿1￿￿
with support
zl ￿
￿
T
1=(1￿￿)
1 + T
1=(1￿￿)
2
￿(1￿￿)=￿
, for T1 = T2 = 2￿￿1, ￿ = 7:2, ￿ = 0:9.
Figure 2: Simulation for 10,000 draws from 1 ￿
￿￿
T1z
￿￿
1
￿ 1
1￿￿ +
￿
T2z
￿￿
2
￿ 1
1￿￿
￿1￿￿
with support
zl ￿
￿
T
1=(1￿￿)
1 + T
1=(1￿￿)
2
￿(1￿￿)=￿
, for T1 = T2 = 2￿￿1, ￿ = 7:2, ￿ = 0:1.
8country l￿ s productivity in production. We will continue to write Til rather than T e
i T
p
l for
notational convenience. In calibrating the model we will capture forces that have speci￿c e⁄ects
on bilateral MP ￿ ows through the country-pair speci￿c MP costs, ￿il (imposing ￿ii = 1), and
leave T e
i and T
p
l to capture productivity parameters for innovation and production that a⁄ect
overall trade and MP patterns at the country level.
We will consider two cases regarding ￿rm entry. One case entails exogenous entry, which
implies that the measure of entrants in each market i is exogenous. For this case we disregard
entry costs and simply assume that all workers are engaged in production. The other case
entails endogenous entry. In particular, the measure of entrants in each market i is determined
so that the expected pro￿ts are equal to the cost of entry, wife
i .
2.2 Firm￿ s Problem
We can think of the ￿rm￿ s problem as follows. First, for each market n a ￿rm decides what is
the cheapest location from which to serve that market, the solution of argminl Ciln. Second,
the ￿rm decides what price to charge. Given our assumption for preferences, this choice leads
to the a mark-up of e ￿ ￿ ￿=(￿ ￿ 1) over marginal cost, so the price is
pin = e ￿ min
l
Ciln . (3)
Third, the ￿rm calculates the associated pro￿ts and if these pro￿ts are higher than the ￿xed
marketing cost wnFn then the ￿rm chooses to serve market n. Therefore, a ￿rm from i will
serve market n if and only if minl Ciln ￿ c￿
n, where c￿
n is the maximum unit cost under which
gross pro￿ts in market n are enough to cover wnFn, and is de￿ned by
c
￿
n =
￿
￿wnFn
Xn
￿1=(1￿￿) Pn
e ￿
; (4)
where Xi is total expenditure in country i.
We assume that for all pairs fi;ng there are ￿rms from i that will decide not to serve market
n. Since all productivity draws in country i are higher than or equal to e T
1=￿
i , this is guaranteed
by the following condition, which we maintain throughout the rest of the paper:
Assumption 2 ￿iln > e T
1=￿
i c￿
n for all i;l;n.
9The following result is a key ingredient in the analysis that follows:
Lemma 1 Let ￿in ￿
hP
k
￿
Tik￿
￿￿
ikn
￿ 1
1￿￿
i1￿￿
and  iln ￿
￿
Til￿
￿￿
iln=￿in
￿ 1
1￿￿ : The (unconditional)
probability that a ￿rm from i will serve market n from l at cost c for c ￿ c￿
n is
Pr
￿
argmin
k
Cikn = l \ min
k
Cikn = c
￿
=  iln￿in￿c
￿￿1; (5)
while the (conditional) probability that ￿rms from i serving market n will choose location l for
production is
Pr
￿
argmin
k
Cikn = l j min
k
Cikn ￿ c
￿
n
￿
=  iln: (6)
The proofs of all the results in the paper are provided in the Appendix. We now turn to the
model￿ s implications for aggregate trade and MP ￿ ows.
2.3 Aggregate implications
Let Mi denote the measure of ￿rms in country i, let Miln denote the measure of ￿rms from i
that serve market n from location l, and let Xiln denote the total value of the associated sales.
Using the pricing rule in (3) and the cut-o⁄ rule in (4) together with the results of Lemma 1
we can show (see Appendix) that
Miln =
￿ ￿ ￿ + 1
￿￿
Xiln
wnFn
(7)
and
Xiln =  iln￿
E
inXn; (8)
where
￿
E
in ￿
P
l Xiln
Xn
=
Mi￿in P
k Mk￿kn
; (9)
is the share of total expenditures in country n that are devoted to goods produced by ￿rms
from i (irrespective of where they are produced).
Aggregate ￿ ows Xiln can be used to construct trade and MP shares. In particular, trade
shares are given by expenditure shares across production locations (ignoring the origin of ￿rms),
￿
T
ln ￿
P
i Xiln=
P
i;k Xikn, while MP shares are given by production shares across ￿rms from
10di⁄erent origins (ignoring the destination of that production), ￿
M
il ￿
P
n Xiln=
P
j;n Xjln. Let-
ting Yl ￿
P
i;n Xiln denote the value of all goods produced in country l (output) and recalling
that Xn ￿
P
i;l Xiln is total expenditure by consumers in country n, trade and MP shares can
be written more succintly as ￿
T
ln =
P
i Xiln=Xn and ￿
M
il =
P
n Xiln=Yl. Using expression (8) we
immediately obtain
￿
T
ln =
X
i
 iln￿
E
in; (10)
and
￿
M
il =
P
n  iln￿
E
inXn
Yl
: (11)
Let ￿iln denote aggregate pro￿ts net of ￿xed marketing costs but gross of entry costs as-
sociated with sales Xiln. Given Dixit-Stiglitz preferences, variable pro￿ts associated with Xiln
are Xiln=￿. The total ￿xed marketing costs paid by these ￿rms are wnFnMiln. Using these two
expressions and (7), we obtain
￿iln = ￿Xiln, (12)
where ￿ ￿ 1=(￿~ ￿). Therefore, total pro￿ts made in country l are a constant share of output in
country l, i.e.
P
i;n ￿iln = ￿Yl.
Marketing wages paid in n are
P
i;l MilnwnFn while wages in production in n are Yn=~ ￿. So
total wages paid to workers in production and marketing in country n are
P
i;l MilnwnFn+Yn=e ￿.
Letting Lp
n denote the amount of labor devoted to production and marketing in country n, and
using (7), we can then write the labor market clearing condition for workers in production and
marketing in country n as
￿ ￿ ￿ + 1
￿￿
(Xn ￿ Yn) + (1 ￿ ￿)Yn = wnL
p
n: (13)
For future reference, note also that, using (11) and (12) and adding over l and n, total pro￿ts
made by ￿rms from country i are given by
X
l;n
￿iln = ￿
X
n
￿
E
inXn . (14)
112.4 Equilibrium
The set of equilibrium conditions depends on whether we have exogenous or endogenous entry.
The current account balance and the labor market clearing conditions are used to determine
equilibrium in both cases. However, under exogenous entry all workers are engaged in production
and marketing whereas under endogenous entry labor can also be used for innovation. In the
case of endogenous entry, a zero-pro￿t condition is also used to solve for the equilibrium since
the measure of entrants (Mi) is endogenous.
We start by characterizing the current account balance.11 For country i, total expenditure
is Xi while total income equals the sum of three terms: (i) the net value of sales, which equals
total sales, Yi, minus the cost of marketing country i0s goods,
P
j;n MjinwnFn; (ii) wages paid
to workers engaged in marketing for sales in country i,
P
j;l MjliwiFi; (iii) net pro￿ts, which
are equal to pro￿ts made by domestic ￿rms,
P
l;n ￿iln, minus pro￿ts made domestically by
foreign ￿rms,
P
j;n ￿jin. Thus, we can write the current account balance condition (i.e., total
expenditure equals total income) as
Xi = Yi ￿
X
j;n
MjinwnFn +
X
j;l
MjliwiFi +
X
l;n
￿iln ￿
X
j;n
￿jin. (15)
Using (12), (8), and (13) we can rewrite this condition as
Xi = wiL
p
i + ￿
X
n
￿
E
inXn: (16)
Next, consider the labor market clearing condition. Total output in country i is Yi =
P
n ￿
T
inXn, hence we can rewrite (13) as
￿ ￿ ￿ + 1
￿￿
Xi +
1
e ￿
X
n
￿
T
inXn = wiL
p
i: (17)
Notice also that ￿
E
in and ￿
T
in are functions of wages, w; and entry levels, M (where variables in
bold are used to denote vectors)
Under exogenous all workers are engaged in production/marketing, L
p
i = Li. Thus, equations
11In this Section we impose current account balance, but in the quantitative section we allow for exogenous
current account imbalances.
12(16) and (17) constitute a system of 2N equations that can be used to solve for the equilibrium
levels of X and w (up to a constant determined by the numeraire).
Under endogenous entry, labor used in production/marketing and entry must add up to the
total labor supply so that the labor market clearing condition is
L
p
i + Mif
e
i = Li. (18)
Together with (17) we get the labor market clearing condition under endogenous entry,
￿ ￿ ￿ + 1
￿￿
Xi +
1
e ￿
X
n
￿
T
inXn + wiMif
e
i = wiLi. (19)
Equilibrium entry, Mi, is determined by the zero-pro￿t condition, namely
P
l ￿il = Miwife
i (we
assume throughout the paper that the equilibrium is interior, so that L
p
i < Li and Mi > 0).
Using (14), this condition can be written as
￿
X
n
￿
E
inXn = Miwif
e
i : (20)
Equations (16), (19) and (20) constitute a system of 3N equations to solve for equilibrium levels
of X; M;w (up to a constant determined by the numeraire).
For future reference, note that (18) together with equations (16) and (20) imply that under
endogenous entry all income takes place through wages so that
Xi = wiLi . (21)
Moreover, letting ri denote the share of labor devoted to innovation in country i, ri ￿ 1￿L
p
i=Li,
then (19) together with (21) implies that
ri ￿ ￿ =
1
e ￿
￿
Xi ￿ Yi
Xi
￿
. (22)
132.5 Special Cases
We now turn to present a number of special cases of the model that we can characterize analyt-
ically. These cases will illustrate the basic forces behind the results of our quantitative analysis
in a later section. Focusing on these cases will allow us to (1) establish a benchmark against
which to compare the impact of MP, (2) show the role of comparative advantage in innovation
vs. production, and (3) explore the role of home market e⁄ects (HME). In all the special cases
we consider here we assume there is endogenous entry.
2.5.1 In￿nite MP costs - the no MP benchmark
It is instructive to consider the extreme case in which MP costs are in￿nite, i.e., ￿il ! 1 for
all i 6= l. This restriction implies that expenditure shares are equal to trade shares, ￿
E
in = ￿
T
in,
and that ￿in = Tii (wi￿in)
￿￿. Given Assumption 1, and using (10) we obtain the expression for
bilateral trade shares,
￿
T
in =
MiT e
i T
p
i (wi￿in)
￿￿
P
k MkT e
kT
p
k (wk￿kn)
￿￿: (23)
These shares are just like in Eaton and Kortum (2002), but instead of the Frechet technology
parameter we now have MiT e
i T
p
i .
With in￿nite MP costs, the equilibrium conditions under endogenous entry imply that entry
is equal to
f Mi = ￿Li=f
e
i : (24)
This result is important because it shows that, with no MP, trade has no e⁄ect on the share of
labor devoted to innovation in any country. More precisely, for all i we have Mife
i =Li = ￿, so the
share of labor devoted to innovation is independent of trade costs f￿lng and also independent of
entry costs ffe
i g. This is reminiscent of the results of Eaton and Kortum (2001) and is consistent
with the results of Arkolakis, Costinot, and Rodr￿guez-Clare (2010), who show that trade has
no impact on entry in the general-equilibrium endogenous-entry version of the Melitz/Chaney
model.
142.5.2 A frictionless world - the role of comparative advantage
We now discuss the role of comparative advantage in innovation vs. production. To make the
analysis tractable we focus on the case of a frictionless world, i.e., ￿ln = 1 and ￿il = 1 for
all i;l;n. Let Ai ￿ (T
p
i )
1=(1￿￿) =Li and ￿i ￿ LiT e
i =
P
k LkT e
k. Ai is an index for a country￿ s
productivity in production and ￿i is a measure of relative size. The equilibrium conditions for
this case lead to the following result for the equilibrium shares of labor devoted to innovation:
Proposition 1 Consider a frictionless world under endogenous entry with fe
i = fe for all i.
Assume that for all i we have
1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)e ￿ <
Ai=(T e
l )
￿=(1￿￿)+1
P
k ￿kAk=(T e
k)
￿=(1￿￿)+1 < 1 + ￿e ￿. (25)
The share of labor devoted to innovation in country i is
ri ￿
Le
i
Li
=
1
e ￿
 
1 ￿
Ai=(T e
l )
￿=(1￿￿)+1
P
k ￿kAk=(T e
k)
￿=(1￿￿)+1
!
+ ￿: (26)
The condition in (25) guarantees that innovation shares in (26) satisfy 0 < ri < 1. If (25)
is not satis￿ed, then at least one country would be completely specialized in innovation or
production, i.e., Le
i = 0 or Le
i = Li for some i.
Proposition 1 summarizes how the di⁄erent parameters determine whether a country spe-
cializes in innovation or production. It tells us that countries with a relatively high ratio of
productivity in innovation to production (i.e., countries that have a comparative advantage in
innovation) will (partially) specialize in innovation. This high ratio will be re￿ ected in an inno-
vation share higher than the world average, i.e., ri > ￿. The countries that have comparative
advantage in innovation will also have a trade de￿cit (i.e., Xi > Yi) as can be seen in equation
(22).
2.5.3 A two-country world - the role of home market e⁄ects
Under endogenous entry but with positive trade and MP costs, our model exhibits home market
e⁄ects that a⁄ect the allocation of production and innovation across large and small countries.
To illustrate this home market e⁄ects in the simplest way, consider a world with two countries
15that are symmetric except for size. We can obtain some analytical results for two extreme cases,
one with frictionless trade and the other with frictionless MP.
Proposition 2 Consider a two-world country under endogenous entry. Assume that A1 = A2,
T e
1 = T e
2 = T e, fe
1 = fe
2 = fe, and L1 > L2.
i) If there are no trade costs, ￿12 = ￿21 = 1, and MP costs are symmetric, ￿12 = ￿21 = ￿ > 1,
then in an interior equilibrium we have r1 > r2.
ii) If there are no MP costs, ￿12 = ￿21 = 1, and trade costs are symmetric, ￿12 = ￿21 = ￿ > 1,
then in an interior equilibrium we have r1 < r2.
The ￿rst part of the proposition shows the existence of a home market e⁄ect in innovation.
Since MP costs are positive but trade is frictionless, it makes sense to innovate in the country
with the larger labor force. The opposite result arises in the case with frictionless MP. In
that case since MP is frictionless but trade is costly, it makes sense to have the large country
specialize in production.
2.6 Welfare Implications
In this section we will illustrate that the model gives simple and intuitive expressions for the
gains from trade and multinational activity of ￿rms. These expressions will be used to study
the welfare implications of openness to trade and multinational production and are derived in
appendix (B.5).
2.6.1 Gains from Openness
By comparing the real expenditure per capita to the one in isolation we can compute a formula
for the gains from openess (i.e., the change in welfare as we move from isolation to the actual
equilibrium),
GOn =
￿
Xnnn
Xn
￿￿
1￿￿
￿ ￿P
l Xnln
Xn
￿￿
￿
￿
2
4￿
 
1
e ￿ + 1
￿ ￿ ￿
1
e ￿
Yn
Xn + 1
￿ ￿ ￿
!1+ 1
￿
￿￿￿+1
(￿￿1)
+ (1 ￿ ￿)
￿
Mn
f Mn
￿1=￿
3
5 ,
(27)
where ￿ is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 under exogenous entry and 0 under
endogenous entry. This expression relates the gains from openness to observable variables
16together with parameters ￿ and ￿. In fact, when there is no MP we can show that the gains
from openness (i.e., the gains of trade in this case) are given by GOn =
￿
￿
T
nn
￿￿1=￿
, as in Eaton
and Kortum (2002) and Arkolakis, Costinot, and Rodr￿guez-Clare (2010).12
If ￿ = 0 then the ￿rst two terms of the RHS of (27) collapse to (Xnnn=Xn)
￿1=￿. The
term Xnnn=Xn is an inverse measure for the degree of openness of country n. As one would
expect, this measure implies that a country is more open with MP than without it, since
Xnnn=Xn < ￿
T
nn =
P
i Xinn=Xn. To understand what happens with ￿ > 0, note that
￿
Xnnn
Xn
￿￿
1￿￿
￿ ￿P
l Xnln
Xn
￿￿
￿
￿
=
  P
l Xnln P
i;l Xiln
!￿ 1
￿ ￿
Xnnn P
l Xnln
￿￿
1￿￿
￿
:
The ￿rst term on the RHS captures the gains for country n from being able to consume goods
produced with foreign technologies (independently of where production takes place), while the
second term captures the gains for country n from being able to use its own technologies abroad
and import the goods back for domestic consumption. Taking as given the equilibrium ￿ ows
Xiln, ￿ > 0 leads to lower gains than ￿ = 0. The reason is that, if productivity draws are
correlated, the gains associated with the second term are not as important.
Compared to the result for gains from openness in the perfect competition setup of Ramondo
and Rodr￿guez-Clare (2009), we now have the extra term
￿
 
1
e ￿ + 1
￿ ￿ ￿
1
e ￿
Yn
Xn + 1
￿ ￿ ￿
!1+ 1
￿
￿￿￿+1
(￿￿1)
+ (1 ￿ ￿)
￿
Mn
f Mn
￿1=￿
:
The ￿rst term captures the gains associated with the pro￿t channel under exogenous entry:
countries with a net pro￿t in￿ ow due to a net out￿ ow of MP have Xn=Yn > 1 and this increases
real expenditure per capita directly and indirectly through its e⁄ect on domestic variety. The
second term captures the e⁄ect of MP on entry. To express this e⁄ect in terms of observable
variables, note that under endogenous entry we have Xn = wnLn. We can use the labor market
12As we showed above, even if Mn is endogenous, in the absence of MP, Mn is not a⁄ected by trade, so Mn
is the same in isolation and in the equilibrium with trade but no MP.
17clearing condition, the de￿nition of rn and Le
n, and equation (22) to obtain
Mn
f Mn
=
Le
n=fe
n
￿Ln=fe
n
=
rn
￿
= ￿
￿
Xn ￿ Yn
Xn
￿
+ 1 (28)
This expression implies that countries with net outward MP ￿ ows (e.g. the United States)
will have Xn > Yn and will experience an increase in entry as a result of openness. For these
countries, given equation (27), our monopolistic competition setup implies larger gains from
openness than the perfect competition model of Ramondo and Rodr￿guez-Clare (2009) while
the opposite conclusion is true for countries with Xn < Yn (e.g., Ireland).
2.6.2 Multinational Production and Real Wages
As mentioned in the Introduction, there is widespread concern that the globalization of pro-
duction by U.S. ￿rms may have a detrimental e⁄ect on domestic workers. In this subsection
we explore whether this e⁄ect is possible in our model. In particular, we study the e⁄ect of
a decline in outward MP costs on the real wage in a country that has a relative abundance
of high-productivity ￿rms (under exogenous entry) or a comparative advantage in innovation
(under endogenous entry). To make the analysis more illustrative, we consider the cases of
exogenous and endogenous entry separately and focus on the comparative statics of a move
from a situation with frictionless trade but no MP to a situation with both frictionless trade
and frictionless MP.
For exogenous entry we assume that ￿ ! 1. This assumption makes it more likely that
MP will hurt workers in rich countries, since the gains from MP arising from di⁄erences in
productivity across countries are not present in this case. By rich countries in this context
we mean countries that have a relative abundance of high-productivity ￿rms, i.e., a relatively
high ratio mi ￿ MiT e
i =Li. We will assume that countries di⁄er only in mi, so we impose that
Ai ￿ (T
p
i )
1=(1￿￿) =Li = A for all i. This assumption implies that productivity in production is
the same across countries. Thus, if mi = m for all i, then wages would also be the same across
countries.
Proposition 3 Consider the case with exogenous entry and assume without loss of generality
that T e
i = Ai = 1 and ￿ ! 1, mi ￿
Li P
k Lk
(￿+1)(￿￿￿￿+1)
(￿￿￿+1) for all i. Assume that mj = ^ m for all
18j 6= i and mi = ^ m+", for " small enough. Consider a switch from frictionless trade but no MP
to frictionless trade and MP. This switch
i) increases real wages i⁄ ￿ < ￿ ￿ ￿
(1+￿)2
1+￿+￿2,
ii) increases real pro￿ts and real expenditure, for any value of ￿.
Opening multinational production implies a downward pressure to the nominal wages of the
￿idea abundant￿countries since ￿rms now have the ability to locate where cheaper labor exists.
In fact, under the condition of mi versus li all countries devote labor to production and wages
equalize under free trade. The resulting higher nominal pro￿ts imply that more varieties are
potentially consumed in the country, which decreases the country￿ s price index. Real wages will
increase if the elasticity of substitution is low enough so that the price index declines compensate
for the decrease in real wages. The positive e⁄ect on real pro￿ts is so strong that also implies
that overall real expenditure is always increasing.
A key assumption of the exogenous entry setup is that ideas can enter the market without
cost. In the free entry case new ideas require the use of labor for the production of the entry
cost. In this situation we can prove a stronger result for the bene￿cial role of MP to real wages
and expenditures.
Proposition 4 Consider the case of endogenous entry and assume that condition (25) holds,
so that the equilibrium in a frictionless world is an interior equilibrium. Consider a switch from
frictionless trade but no MP to both frictionless trade and MP. This switch increases real wages
(and real expenditures).
Comparing Propositions 3 and 4 reveals that the results of a decline in MP costs critically
depend on whether entry is exogenous or endogenous. The possibility of a negative e⁄ect of MP
on wages in countries with a high MiT e
i =Li ratio arises because the same number of workers in
Li now have fewer goods that are produced there ￿but if entry is endogenous, then a natural
outcome is that workers engaged in production will move to innovation. By decreasing the
supply of labor to the production sector, this leads to an improvement in the country￿ s terms
of trade, and this mechanism is what allows the country to avoid a decline in real wages under
endogenous entry.
193 Calibration
We ￿t our model with endogenous entry to international expenditure, production, trade, and
multinational sales data. We ￿rst discuss how can we obtain information about the level of
technological parameters ￿ and ￿ by looking at the elasticity of expenditure by country n
on goods produced in country l with respect to trade friction between n and l. Given this
information we describe a methodology to estimate the technology parameters, ￿ and ￿, the
N ￿1 vectors T
e and T
p, and the N ￿(N ￿1) trade and MP frictions, ￿ and ￿, using data on
endowments (the N ￿1 vector of equipped labor), the N ￿(N ￿ 1) matrix of trade shares and
MP shares ￿
M.
3.1 Gravity and Trade Elasticities
Loosely speaking, the value of ￿ governs the substitutability across products of heterogeneous
￿rms from a given origin and the value of ￿ governs the substitutability across di⁄erent pro-
duction locations for a given ￿rm. To infer the value of these parameters, we will consider the
trade elasticity estimated from two distinct gravity equations.
The ￿rst gravity equation, which is unique to our model of trade and MP, is de￿ned over
Xiln, the sales volumes of the set of ￿rms that originate in country i, produce in country l,
and sell in country n. Because this gravity equation is de￿ned over a sample restricted to ￿rms
that originate in a particular i (here, the United States), we refer to this equation as ￿restricted
gravity.￿The second gravity equation is de￿ned over Xln ￿
P
i Xiln, the sales of all ￿rms that
are operating in country l and selling in country n. Because this gravity equation is de￿ned
over ￿rms from all countries, we refer to this equation as ￿unrestricted gravity.￿
3.1.1 Restricted Gravity
To estimate the restricted gravity equation, we use expression (8 ￿ see also equation (35) in the
Appendix￿ ) and take logarithms to obtain
lnXiln = ￿
r
il + ￿
r
in ￿
￿
1 ￿ ￿
ln￿ln, (29)
20where ￿r
il is a location of production ￿xed e⁄ect that corresponds (in the model) to
￿il = ln
￿
Mi
￿
T
e
i T
p
l (wl￿il)
￿￿￿ 1
1￿￿
￿
and ￿r
in is a country of destination ￿xed e⁄ect that corresponds (in the model) to
￿
r
in = ln
0
@ Xn￿
￿￿
1￿￿
in P
k Mk￿kn
1
A:
Equation (29) relates sales of ￿rms from i producing in l and selling to n to a production location
and a destination ￿xed e⁄ect as well as to the trade friction between l and n, ￿ln. To estimate
￿=(1 ￿ ￿) we exploit the fact that it a⁄ects the relationship between Xiln and ￿ln.
A di¢ culty of operationalizing (29) is that we must have an accurate measure of the relative
size of trade frictions between countries l and n. The standard practice in the gravity literature
is to use a proxy for ￿ln such as distance or shared language. However, such practice does not
reveal the structural parameters of interest as the coe¢ cient estimate on the relevant trade
friction con￿ ates the variation of ￿ln with the proxy and the trade elasticity of interest.13
We rely on a measure of the size of trade costs that is directly related to a critical component
in ￿ln, which is the asymmetric treatment across locations of production in the tari⁄s applied
to goods. Speci￿cally, we operationalize equation (29) by parameterizing trade costs as
ln￿ln = ln(1 + tln) +
X
k
￿k[1jdln 2 dk] + ￿Hln + eiln;
where tln is the simple average tari⁄applied by n on goods from l, [1jdln 2 dk] indicator variables
for a given distance between n and l whose marginal e⁄ect on trade cost is given by ￿j, and Hln
is a vector of standard gravity controls, including a shared language, shared colonial history, a
shared border, and a ￿border e⁄ect￿indicator variable, called self, that is equal to one if l = n.
13This fact led Eaton and Kortum (2002), Donaldson (2008), and Simonovska and Waugh (2009) to use price
gaps of homogeneous goods between locations to back out measures of ￿ln. In our monopolistically competitive
model we cannot use these variations for the same purpose so we need to resort to di⁄erent ways of measuring
￿ln.
21This yields the ￿restricted￿gravity equation,
lnXiln = ￿
r
l + ￿
r
n + ￿
r ln(1 + tln) +
X
k
e ￿
r
k[1jdln 2 dk] + e ￿
rHln + e eiln; (30)
that we estimate. To the extent that constructed measures of tln accurately capture variation in
asymmetric trade frictions between countries, the coe¢ cient ￿
r has the structural interpretation
of the parameter ratio ￿=(1￿￿). The coe¢ cients on the other, more standard, proxies for trade
costs such as the distance indicator variables, do not have a direct structural interpretation as
they are a mixture of the e⁄ect of the variable on the size of trade cost and ￿=(1￿￿). Because
in our data there will be multiple observations for each production location l and for each
destination country n, we can estimate equation (30) via least squares with dummy variables.
To estimate equation (30) we use data on the operation of U.S. manufacturing ￿rms across
multiple locations constructed from the 1999 benchmark survey of the Bureau of Economic
Analysis (BEA) on the operations of U.S. multinationals abroad. For each country l, we observe
sales of U.S. multinationals in their host country and their exports to the United States, Canada,
a composite of fourteen European Union countries, Japan, and the United Kingdom. We also
observe the domestic sales of U.S. ￿rms in the United States (netting out the sales of foreign
a¢ liates in the United States) and their exports to each country in the data set. Details about
the construction of the data can be found in the data Appendix.
In our sample of the global operations of U.S. multinationals, there are two forms of variation
in tln that identify ￿
r. The ￿rst type of variation in the data is due to the fact that ￿rms that
open a local a¢ liate avoid all trade costs (i.e. tnn = 0) while ￿rms from another country
generally must pay the applied MFN tari⁄ rate. A second source of variation in tln is due to
the fact that some l and n belong to common preferential trade agreements (and so tln = 0)
while others do not (so ￿rms from l pay country n￿ s MFN applied tari⁄ rates).14
There are several concerns that arise in using tari⁄ data to estimate the trade elasticity.
First, there is the problem of endogeneity: country pairs for which there is a natural a¢ nity
for trade are more likely to agree to preferential trading arrangements. For this reason, it is
important that we include standard gravity controls in (30) which proxy for this a¢ nity. To the
14There is also some variation in constructed tari⁄ measures due to the fact that developed countries extend
GSP tari⁄s to a number of developing countries.
22extent that there are other determinants of preferential trading agreements that are excluded
from (30), there may be an upward bias in the size of the trade elasticity. A second potential
problem arises because the model does not suggest an appropriate way to aggregate tari⁄s
across industries. We have chosen a simple average of applied tari⁄s because other aggregation
schemes tend to be either ad hoc or have an element of endogeneity to them. We plan to explore
alternative aggregation schemes in future versions of the paper. To the extent that the level of
policy induced trade frictions between countries is seriously mismeasured our estimate of ￿
r will
be biased downward. Finally, we include self to control for the variation in tln that is due to
unmeasured border e⁄ects, such as administrative and information costs, that local production
avoids.
3.1.2 Unrestricted Regression
The ￿unrestricted￿gravity equation has the same form as the ￿restricted￿gravity equation but
is estimated instead on the bilateral sales of all ￿rms located in country l selling to country n.
Speci￿cally, we estimate
lnXln = ￿
u
l + ￿
u
n + ￿
u ln(1 + tln) +
X
k
e ￿
u
k[1jdln 2 dk] + e ￿
uHln + viln: (31)
The coe¢ cient estimate ^ ￿
u from the ￿unrestricted￿gravity equation does not have a structural
interpretation, but it can still provide information on the relative magnitudes of ￿ and ￿. To
see this, recall that if MP were not possible then all exports would be done by local ￿rms and
the coe¢ cient on tari⁄s would be equal to ￿. This is because, without MP, the correlation in
productivity across production locations (determined by ￿) is irrelevant, so the trade elasticity
is given by ￿, as in the standard Melitz/Chaney model. Now, since in the data most exports
are done by domestic ￿rms, then Xln disproportionately contains information on the operations
of domestic ￿rms, and this suggests that ^ ￿
u will be closer to ￿ than is the case for ^ ￿
r, which
should be higher and equal to ￿=(1 ￿ ￿). In other words, we expect that 0 > ￿￿ > ^ ￿
u >
^ ￿
r = ￿￿=(1 ￿ ￿). Another bene￿t to estimating the unrestricted gravity equation is because
doing so will allow us to compare the trade elasticity implied by our tari⁄-based methodology
to elasticities obtained by the price-gap methodologies as mentioned above.
We estimate (31) using data on trade volumes of manufacturing industries and domestic
23absorption. We restrict the sample so that the coverage of the restricted and unresticted samples
(l;n) is the same.
3.1.3 Results
The coe¢ cient estimates for the two regressions are reported in Table 1.
Distance Dummies Other Gravity Controls
Tari⁄ D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 Self Bord Lang Col R-sq.
Restricted -10.8 -0.4 -2.5 -3.2 -2.5 -3.2 2.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.84
(-3.1) (-0.8) (-4.8) (-6.3) (-4.9) (-5.5) (3.4) (0.6) (1.0) (0.8)
Unrestricted -4.1 -0.7 -1.3 -2.0 -1.6 -1.5 3.6 1.1 -0.3 0.1 0.89
(-2.1) (-2.7) (-4.5) (-7.2) (-5.9) (-4.6) (10.0) (3.7) (-1.7) (0.4)
Table 1: Restricted and Unrestricted Gravity
In Table 1 each column corresponds to a dependent variable, while the ￿rst and second rows
correspond to the restricted and unrestricted speci￿cations, respectively. T-statistics are shown
in parentheses under their respective coe¢ cient estimate. Of most relevance to our analysis are
the elasticity estimates for tari⁄ shown in the ￿rst column. Note that the underlying data in
both speci￿cations has 317 observations. The trade elasticity in the restricted regression of
10.8 is our estimate of ￿=(1￿￿). Note that the trade elasticity in the unrestricted regression is
signi￿cantly smaller at 4.1. This smaller value implies that the exports of multinational ￿rms
are far more sensitive to trade costs than those of domestic ￿rms as expected. This greater
sensitivity of the sales of multinational a¢ liates to trade costs than for domestic ￿rms also
appears in the coe¢ cient estimates on the distance categories. For each distance class, the
coe¢ cient is more negative in the restricted regression than in the unrestricted regression.
The coe¢ cient on tari⁄s of 4.1 obtained from the unrestricted gravity estimation is of a
remarkably similar magnitude to the trade elasticity obtained from the price gap literature.
Eaton and Kortum (2002) ￿nd that the elasticity varies between 2 and 12, while using a re￿ned
methodology Simonovska and Waugh (2009) ￿nd that the trade elasticity is in the neighborhood
of 4. The similarity between our estimate from the unrestricted gravity regression to that
obtained from price-gap methodology gives us some con￿dence in the restricted entry coe¢ cient
of 10.8.
243.2 The Estimation Algorithm
We restrict our analysis to the set of nineteen OECD countries considered by Eaton and Ko-
rtum (2002): Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, United
Kingdom, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Portugal, Swe-
den, and the United States. We use STAN data on manufacturing trade ￿ ows from country l
to country n as the empirical counterpart for trade in the model, Xln for n 6= l, and STAN pro-
duction data (less aggregate exports) for Xnn. We use these data to calculate the N ￿N matrix
of trade shares ￿
T
ln and the N ￿ 1 vector of aggregate expenditure by country Xn. Further,
we calculate the N ￿ 1 vector of aggregate outputs Yl from Yl =
P
n ￿
T
lnXn: We use UNCTAD
data on the gross value of production for multinational a¢ liates from i in l as the empirical
counterpart of bilateral MP and use this data to calculate the N￿N matrix of ownership shares
￿
M
in. Finally, we measure the N ￿ 1 vector of endowments Li as equipped labor.15
We need to set values for ￿, ￿, and ￿. For our model to match the restricted elasticity
estimated above we impose ￿=(1 ￿ ￿) = 10:8. We then set the values of ￿ and ￿ so as to do
well along three dimensions: the implied mark-up for each ￿rm, ￿=(￿ ￿ 1), the implied pro￿t
share, ￿ ￿ 1
~ ￿￿, and the unrestricted elasticity implied by the calibrated model. The estimates of
Martins, Scarpetta, and Pilat (1996) for the average mark-up across OECD countries are in the
range of 13% to 26%, implying a markup of around 20%, while in the United States a 15% of
total income corresponds to intangible capital (see Corrado, Hulten, and Sichel (2009)). These
estimates imply values ￿ = 6 and ￿ = 0:15. Given ￿ = 1=(~ ￿￿) , these values imply ￿ = 5:56.
But this level of ￿ implies an unrestricted elasticity that is too high. We compromise and choose
the parameter values of ￿ = 4 and ￿ = 4:3. The implication is that both the mark-up and the
pro￿t share will be a bit high (e ￿ = 1:33 and ￿ = 17:4), but the bene￿t is that the calibrated
model will imply an unrestricted elasticity closer to 4.
We set fe
i = 1 for all i. This second assumption is a necessary normalization since fe and
T e are not separately identi￿ed. We now turn to the estimation algorithm used to identify the
remaining parameters of the model.
Preliminary calculations
15See Ramondo and Rodr￿guez-Clare (2009) for an explanation of how these equipped labor levels are
constructed.
25The algorithm is based on the fact that we have enough trade and MP cost parameters to
exactly match bilateral trade and MP shares. Given that, we can proceed to infer a number
of variables in the model using data for trade and MP shares even before calibrating the trade
and MP cost parameters:16
1. Under endogenous entry, total wages (or national income) are given by
wiLi =
￿ ￿ ￿ + 1
￿￿
(Xl ￿ Yl) + (1 ￿ ￿)Yl + ￿
X
l
￿
M
il Yl. ,
where this equation is obtained by combining (19) and (20) with equation (11) summed
over all l￿ s.
2. In our model we assumed current account balance, which implies Xi = wiLi. But this
relationship is not satis￿ed in the data. To proceed, we follow Dekle, Eaton, and Kortum
(2008) and simply assume that there is an exogenous current account de￿cit, ￿i, which
allows expenditure, Xi, to be di⁄erent than total income, wiLi,
￿i = Xi ￿ wiLi:
3. We infer the share of labor that is devoted to innovation as implied by equation (22).
4. The N ￿ 1 vector of entrants M is given by
Mi = riLi=f
e
i = riLi:
where fe
i = 1 has been imposed.
5. Finally, the N ￿1 vector of T
p
l are chosen so that productivity in production is e⁄ectively
the same across countries: Ai = A for all i (recall that Ai ￿ (T
p
i )
1=(1￿￿) =Li). Without
loss of generality we set A = 1, so T
p
l = L
1￿￿
l .
The Estimation of Parameters
16In practice, the algorithm matches all these magnitudes very well, but not exactly as in the data.
26To estimate the matrices of trade and MP frictions and N￿1 vector of technology parameters
T
e, we use trade and MP shares, and a two-step iterative procedure explained below.
Step 1: Compute Trade and MP frictions
Given the above pre-determined variables and parameters and a guess of technology para-
meters T
e, we can compute ￿￿ s and ￿￿ s. To do this, we note that the model delivers structural
equations for trade and MP shares. We simply solve a system of 2N (N ￿ 1) equations, equa-
tions (10) and (11), in 2N (N ￿ 1) unknowns, the ￿il and the ￿ln. We impose ￿jj = ￿jj = 1 for
all j, but the system is not over-identi￿ed because
P
l ￿
T
ln =
P
i ￿
M
il = 1.
Step 2: Update the technology parameters T e
We update our guess of technology parameters T
e by solving the system of equations from
the zero-pro￿t condition, equation (20). If convergence in T
e has not been achieved update T
e
using a mixture of the initial guess and the new values and return to Step 1. Otherwise the
procedure ends.17
A natural question is about the source of identi￿cation of T
e￿ s. Indeed, one could imagine
that a change in T
e￿ s could be perfectly compensated by changing ￿￿ s in such a way that MP
shares are not a⁄ected. This intuition can be veri￿ed in the version of our model with no trade,
where it is true that the T
e￿ s cannot be separately identi￿ed from the ￿￿ s. Similarly, the T
e￿ s
cannot be separately identi￿ed from the ￿￿ s in a model with no MP. These observations imply
that having both MP and trade is necessary for identi￿cation of T
e￿ s separately from ￿￿ s and
￿￿ s. To understand the identi￿cation in the case of both MP and trade, note ￿rst that for any
level of T
e￿ s, the above estimation algorithm ￿nds the ￿￿ s and ￿￿ s that make the model match
the MP and trade shares. In addition, in the model with both MP and trade, the zero-pro￿t
conditions depend on ￿
E
in￿ s, which are di⁄erent from either ￿
T
il￿ s or ￿
M
il ￿ s. Thus, in a sense, the
￿￿ s are identi￿ed by the MP shares, the ￿￿ s are identi￿ed by the trade shares, and the T
e￿ s are
identi￿ed by the zero pro￿t conditions through their impact on ￿
E
in￿ s.
Once convergence has been achieved, we can compute an arti￿cial data set of bilateral trade
volumes, Xln and trade costs ￿ln. We then regress the logarithm of these trade volumes on
17Since we are calibrating the model to data on shares, we need to specify the scale of T
e ￿to do so we set
the value of Te for the US to one.
27location and source ￿xed e⁄ects and the implied trade costs ￿ln. The coe¢ cient on the ln￿ln is
the calibrated model￿ s implied unrestricted trade elasticity that we will compare with the value
of ￿4:1 that we got from the data in the unrestricted gravity regression.
4 Results
We now discuss the results of our calibration exercise. We begin by reporting summary measures
of the key model parameters which include the measures of T e
i , which capture comparative
advantage in innovation, and the average inward and outward trade and MP frictions facing
￿rms, ￿ and ￿. To aid in understanding the workings of the model we consider a number of
comparative static exercises.
By construction, the model ￿ts the data to which it is calibrated nearly perfectly. The
R-squared between the ￿tted and actual trade shares is 0.97 and 0.99 between the ￿tted and
actual MP shares. The small discrepancies between the ￿tted and actual data arise because the
estimated ￿0s and ￿0s are constrained to be no less than one in the iterative algorithm and this
constraint binds for a small fraction of elements in the respective matrices.18
The model implies an unrestricted trade elasticity of ￿4:73 which is a bit higher than the
one we estimated in the data (^ ￿
u = ￿4:1). We now discuss two relevant dimensions to evaluate
the performance of the model. First, recall that we infer the value of the innovation share ri
using the model together with data on trade and MP shares. How does this relate to R&D
intensity in the data? In Figure 3 we plot a scatter of ri=rUS along the horizontal axis versus the
share of labor devoted to R&D in the data (relative to the US). There is a remarkable positive
association between the two variables in spite of the fact that we did not use any R&D data to
estimate the innovation intensity in the model.
Second, we compare the importance of exports by foreign a¢ liates in the model and in the
data. We focus on the share of production by ￿rms from i in country l that is sold outside
of l, relative to total production by ￿rms from i in country l. We refer to this as the BMP
share of i in l, and denote it by bmpil, so bmpil ￿
P
n6=l Xiln=
P
n Xiln. Using BEA data we can
18The constraint binds in 2% and 1.5% of possible cases for trade and MP, respectively. The Netherlands
stand out as a somewhat problematic case which may re￿ ect the fact that it is a major entrepot center.
28Figure 3: Innovation share in the model versus R&D intensity in the data (both as labor shares
normalized to the US).
29measure bmpil for i = US. Doing that and averaging across l we obtain an overall BMP share
for foreign a¢ liates of US multinationals, bmpUS, in the manufacturing sector. This comes out
to be 39%. This says that, on average, foreign a¢ liates of US multinationals export 39% of
their output. Our model comes up short in this dimension: when we compute bmpUS in the
model we get 11%. We believe that the model￿ s failure in this respect is due to the fact that,
having no non-tradable goods, the implied trade costs are too high ￿preliminary calculations
with a model that includes non-tradable goods do signi￿cantly better in this regard.
4.1 The Parameter Estimates
Table 2 contains summary measures of the parameters identi￿ed by the estimation algorithm.
For each country in the sample, the country￿ s innovation productivity parameter is shown in the
￿rst column. We present it as (T e
i )
1=￿ since this has a more natural interpretation as productivity
in innovation than T e
i . In the second and third columns, weighted average outward and inward
￿0s are shown, where the weights are the shares of global labor. In the ￿fth and sixth column
are the weighted average outward and inward estimates of ￿0s.
It is important here to point out how the parameters are identi￿ed by the data. Figure 4
shows a scatter plot with the calibrated levels of T e
i on the horizontal axis and the innovation
shares ri from the data on the vertical axis. The ￿gure suggests that high levels of ri in the data
lead to a high levels of T e
i in the calibration. Figure 5 shows scatter plots with a measure of
bilateral trade or MP ￿ ows on the horizontal axis and a measure of bilateral trade or MP costs
on the vertical axis. This ￿gure suggests that trade and MP shares pin down trade and MP
costs in the calibration, respectively.19 In sum, the parameters in the model are identi￿ed in a
clear and intuitive manner from the data: innovation productivity levels T e
i are pinned down
by innovation intensities in the data, ri, and trade and MP costs, f￿lng and f￿ilg, are identi￿ed
by trade and MP shares in the data,
￿
￿
T
ln
￿
and
￿
￿
M
il
￿
.
As an additional check on our results, Figure 6 shows a scatter plot of the the trade costs
19The measure of bilateral trade ￿ ows is the log of the product of the normalized trade ￿ ows for each country
pair, i.e.,
￿
T
ln
￿T
ll
￿
T
nl
￿T
nn. An analogous measure is used for bilateral MP ￿ ows. For trade costs we use the log of
the product of trade costs for each country pair, i.e., ￿ln￿nl, and analogously for MP costs. We choose these
measures because in a model without MP we would have
￿
T
ln
￿T
ll
￿
T
nl
￿T
nn = (￿ln￿nl)
￿￿ so
￿
T
ln
￿T
ll
￿
T
nl
￿T
nn seems to be a natural
measure of bilateral trade.
30Figure 4: Data ri against calibrated T e
i
Figure 5: Normalized bilateral MP shares (left) and trade shares (right) from the data (hori-
zontal axis) against bilateral MP and trade costs (in logs).
31Figure 6: Trade costs implied by gravity regression versus calibrated trade costs (demeaned).
implied by the (restricted) gravity equation and our calibrated trade costs.20 The ￿gure suggests
that the calibrated trade costs have the expected correlation with the typical gravity variables
such as distance and border e⁄ects.
The seventh and eight columns of Table 2 contain the share of labor employed in innovation
as implied by the data and the counterfactual share of labor employed in innovation that obtains
from simulating the model holding ￿xed the estimated trade and MP frictions while constraining
each country￿ s innovation productivity parameter to unity.
In interpreting the estimated parameters it is useful to recall that the model interprets
variation in production and ownership patterns strictly through the lens of proximity versus
comparative advantage. A country can be an attractive location for innovation either because
it is very capable at generating high productivity ￿rms (T e
i ) or because it a⁄ords excellent access
to a large labor force (relative to its attractiveness as a production location).
The estimates of (T e
i )
1=￿ vary considerably across countries ranging from a low of 0:74 for
New Zealand to 1:71 for the Netherlands. The variation in these parameters gives us some sense
about who has a comparative advantage in innovation versus production: the Netherlands and
the Scandinavian countries stand out as having a strong comparative advantage in innovation.
20The trade costs implied by the restricted gravity equation are the ￿tted values of Xiln divided by the trade
elasticity estimate of 10.8. Note that because the trade costs implied by the restricted gravity equation have
been estimated using importer and exporter ￿xed e⁄ects, and so have been demeaned, the calibrated trade costs
have been demeaned to make them comparable.
32￿ ￿ ri
(T e
i )
1=￿ Outward Inward Outward Inward Calibrated With T e
i = 1
Australia 0.96 2.57 3.58 3.22 2.95 0.164 0.123
Austria 0.97 3.02 3.87 2.45 3.38 0.145 0.071
Belgium 0.95 1.86 2.22 2.18 2.16 0.162 0.536
Canada 1.03 2.46 2.16 2.28 2.22 0.131 0.056
Denmark 0.96 2.69 4.10 2.68 3.49 0.196 0.246
Spain 1.04 3.16 3.31 2.33 4.08 0.147 0.088
Finland 1.25 2.94 3.72 2.00 5.30 0.187 0.092
France 1.02 2.50 2.52 2.29 2.67 0.161 0.116
Gr. Britain 0.98 2.26 2.32 2.62 2.09 0.190 0.178
Germany 0.90 1.88 2.27 2.69 1.75 0.179 0.309
Greece 0.97 3.13 6.21 2.32 7.73 0.178 0.152
Italy 1.22 3.30 2.97 1.72 5.03 0.160 0.080
Japan 1.08 2.25 2.39 1.83 3.03 0.180 0.167
Netherlands 1.71 3.07 1.38 1.78 2.65 0.254 0.001
Norway 1.32 3.06 4.30 2.05 5.93 0.201 0.005
New Zealand 0.74 2.64 5.64 3.16 3.33 0.086 0.403
Portugal 0.76 2.76 4.55 3.38 2.87 0.110 0.253
Sweden 1.38 2.86 2.57 2.10 3.73 0.166 0.001
United States 1 1.52 1.23 1.88 1.12 0.175 0.173
Table 2: Summary Statistics for Benchmark Calibration
Regarding the results for trade and MP frictions, two comments are in order. First, in
general, the level of trade frictions appears to be very large. In interpreting the magnitude of
these estimates, note that the parameters used in the estimating algorithm were chosen to match
a relatively low trade elasticity of between 4 and 5. The lower the trade elasticity, the higher
frictions between countries need to be to ￿t the data. Second, because of the weighting scheme,
large countries will generally be more open to MP and trade because they have frictionless
access to their own markets (￿ll = ￿nn = 1). Japan and the United States, the two largest
countries, have well below average levels of average MP and trade frictions.
4.2 Comparative Advantage and Home Market E⁄ects
The most e⁄ective way to interpret the relative importance of comparative advantage in in-
novation versus production and the advantages conveyed by geography is to shut down the
comparative advantage in innovation by setting all T e
i = 1 while holding ￿xed the trade and
33MP frictions and then to compare across the two equilibria the share of labor that is employed
in innovation. This comparison involves the seventh and eight columns of Table 2. We see that
shutting down di⁄erences in T e
i can have enormous e⁄ects on the share of a country￿ s resources
that are devoted to production. For instance, in the case of the Netherlands, the share of labor
used in innovation falls from 0:25 to 0:001, which indicates that the only reason that the huge
foreign network of Dutch multinationals can be rationalized given its location is by having a
strong comparative advantage in innovation. In the absence of its strong comparative advantage
in innovation, foreign ￿rms would dominate Dutch production. The same outcome obtains for
the other countries with initially high T e
i , Finland, Norway, and Sweden, where geography is
evidently not favorable to entry. By contrast, eliminating the implied comparative disadvantage
of Belgium, Germany, and New Zealand are associated with much higher levels of innovative
activity.
The comparison of the equilibrium r across countries in the last column of Table 2 reveals the
importance of home market e⁄ects (HMEs), since that is the only determinant of innovation
intensities once we set T e
i = 1 for all i. For example, innovation in Sweden basically shuts
down while it increases to 54% in Belgium. The explanation is Sweden￿ s geography is relatively
attractive as a place for production while Belgium￿ s geography is relatively attractive as a place
for innovation. New Zealand￿ s innovation intensity also becomes quite high when we set all T e
i
to one, the reason being that given its isolation New Zealand is a bad location for production,
so its resources are better deployed in innovation. Exactly the opposite happens for Canada:
a low estimated cost for US ￿rms to do business in Canada and a low cost of exporting from
Canada to the United States makes Canada a good location for production, as re￿ ected in a
low r of 5:6%.
4.3 Gains from Openness
Equation (27) and (28) imply that the gains from openness can be computed from ￿ ows,
GOn =
￿
Xnnn
Xn
￿￿
1￿￿
￿ ￿P
l Xnln
Xn
￿￿
￿
￿
| {z }
Direct E⁄ect
"
￿
￿
Xn
Yn
￿1+
￿￿(￿￿1)
￿(￿￿1)
+ (1 ￿ ￿)
￿
￿ ￿ 1 + Xn=Yn
￿Xn=Yn
￿1=￿#
| {z }
Indirect E⁄ect on Pro￿ts or Innovation
34The gains from openness can be decomposed into a direct e⁄ect operating through the trade
and MP ￿ ows and an indirect e⁄ect that captures the e⁄ect of openness on pro￿ts (in the case
of exogenous entry) or innovation (in the case of endogenous entry).
One problem in computing GOn with our calibrated model is that we have allowed for
current account imbalances, and it is not clear how to think about the gains from openness in
the presence of such imbalances. To proceed, we recomputed the equilibrium imposing current
account balance, and then calculated the gains from openness and its decomposition into the
direct and indirect e⁄ects operating through pro￿ts and innovation (see Table 3). A small and
open economy like Belgium gets enormous gains, 121%, coming primarily from the direct e⁄ect.
The Netherlands also enjoys large gains from openness, but being specialized in innovation, a
signi￿cant part of these gains come from a positive indirect e⁄ect. The contrary occurs in New
Zealand, where the gains are also large, but a negative indirect e⁄ect of ￿17% decreases those
gains signi￿cantly.
r GO Direct E⁄ect Pro￿ts Innovation
Australia 0.148 1.154 1.200 0.961 0.972
Austria 0.127 1.403 1.482 0.947 0.956
Belgium 0.195 2.210 2.121 1.042 0.989
Canada 0.128 1.498 1.612 0.929 0.943
Denmark 0.189 1.353 1.325 1.021 1.027
Spain 0.138 1.123 1.184 0.948 0.955
Finland 0.191 1.261 1.235 1.021 1.021
France 0.158 1.181 1.208 0.977 0.980
Great Britain 0.183 1.246 1.230 1.013 1.017
Germany 0.177 1.189 1.188 1.001 1.005
Greece 0.158 1.078 1.107 0.974 0.980
Italy 0.160 1.079 1.100 0.981 0.980
Japan 0.183 1.049 1.034 1.014 1.014
Netherlands 0.313 1.833 1.617 1.133 1.115
Norway 0.187 1.230 1.207 1.019 1.031
New Zealand 0.065 1.390 1.670 0.832 0.887
Portugal 0.089 1.371 1.533 0.894 0.915
Sweden 0.173 1.377 1.381 0.997 0.993
United States 0.172 1.074 1.077 0.997 0.999
Table 3: Gains from Openness
354.4 E⁄ects of Globalization
As mentioned in the Introduction, we want to explore the e⁄ects of an increase in MP by
￿rms in rich countries. As these ￿rms move operations to low wage locations, how does this
a⁄ect workers in rich countries? How do the results depend on whether entry is exogenous
or endogenous? Under endogenous entry, what is the e⁄ect on innovation in countries with
comparative advantage in innovation or production? One problem with our current calibration
is that it only includes OECD countries. To proceed, we replace New Zealand by a country with
a size of China. In particular, we compute the equilibrium for a world that is like the calibrated
model above except that now New Zealand has China￿ s population. From now on we refer to
this country as China. (We also set all current account de￿cits to zero, but this doesn￿ t a⁄ect
the results we report below).
End. Entry, ￿US;CH = 1 Ex. Entry, ￿US;CH = 1
r (in %) r (in %) % change w
P % change w
P % change X
P
Australia 15.1 17.9 6.4 7.3 3.2
Austria 16.0 15.3 4.9 1.0 2.0
Belgium 15.5 0.5 -0.6 0.3 0.9
Canada 1.4 0.1 15.3 -0.5 -0.4
Denmark 19.2 18.5 3.7 0.3 1.3
Spain 13.5 12.7 2.5 0.3 0.8
Finland 17.9 19.4 2.7 0.3 0.0
France 15.9 13.5 2.9 0.5 0.7
Gr. Britain 13.4 14.1 2.6 0.7 1.1
Germany 4.9 16.1 0.4 0.3 0.5
Greece 13.0 16.0 5.2 1.3 0.0
Italy 16.1 15.6 2.3 0.5 0.8
Japan 17.8 16.5 2.3 0.7 1.0
Netherlands 27.8 2.4 3.8 0.2 1.2
Norway 18.5 19.3 1.2 0.3 0.0
￿ China￿ 18.8 0.1 29.8 16.1 6.5
Portugal 11.7 13.0 5.2 0.9 2.2
Sweden 18.2 11.4 0.8 -0.3 -0.6
United States 17.8 54.8 33.5 4.4 29.2
Table 4: Counterfactual Experiment
We ￿rst compute the equilibrium for this hypothetical world. The ￿rst column of Table 4
shows the results for r. China￿ s equilibrium r is a bit higher than ￿, indicating that it specializes
to some degree in innovation. This compares with a low r for New Zealand in the benchmark
36calibration (see Table 2). This illustrates the importance of HMEs in our model. The average
inward gamma that we estimated for New Zealand is high relative to the country￿ s trade costs,
so as country size expands, this HMEs lead to an increase in innovation. The second column
shows what happens to r as we eliminate frictions for the United States in doing MP in China,
i.e. we set ￿US;CH = 1. Since the U.S. has a comparative advantage in innovation relative
to China ((T e
US)
1=￿ = 1 > (T e
CH)
1=￿ = 0:74) then this leads to an increase in r in the U.S. to
0:56 and a collapse in innovation in China, where r basically becomes zero. The third column
shows the e⁄ect of the decline in ￿US;CH on the real wage (recall that under endogenous entry
this is equal to real expenditure). As suggested by Proposition 4, the decline in MP costs for
the United States in China leads to an increase in the U.S. real wage of 33:5%. The real wage
in China increases by 29:8%. Most of the other countries experience signi￿cant increases in real
wages thanks to the fact that they can now bene￿t from the increases in worldwide productivity
arising from the possibility of using U.S. technologies to produce in China. Belgium experiences
a decline in the real wage, presumably because many U.S. ￿rms that were doing MP in Belgium
now move to China. Canada experiences a particularly large increase in the real wage (15:3%),
presumably because the low trade and MP costs between the United States and Canada imply
that Canada bene￿ts as the United States gets richer.
The model suggests that the negative e⁄ect on U.S. workers may indeed take place under
exogenous entry. The fourth and ￿fth columns of Table 4 show the e⁄ects of the decline in ￿US;CH
on real wages and real expenditure for all the countries in our sample. The real wage actually
increases in the United States by 4.4% while real expenditure increases much more (29:2%).
The opposite happens in China: the real wage increases by more than real expenditures (16:1%
vs 6:5%). The implication is that the possibility outlined in Proposition 3 does not apply in
our calibrated model. We explored this further by imagining a world just like the one above
but with frictionless trade. In this case it turns out that the decline in ￿US;CH decreases real
wages in the United States by 6% whereas real expenditure increases by 18%.
5 Conclusion
[TBD]
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A Data Appendix
The production data for the restricted sample (Xiln; where i = U.S.) were assembled from several
sources that depend on the location of production l. For the case of l 6= U:S: (U.S. MP abroad),
our data are from the con￿dential 1999 survey of the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA)
of U.S. direct investment abroad. This legally mandatory survey identi￿es all U.S. ￿rms that
own productive facilities abroad. The survey requires ￿rms to report for their majority-owned,
manufacturing a¢ liates the location of the a¢ liates l, the sales of these a¢ liates to customers
in their host country (l = n) and their sales to customers in the United States, Canada,
Japan, the United Kingdom, and an aggregation of a subset of countries in the European
Union21 (l 6= U:S:;n).22 For the case of l = U:S:, the data was constructed using a mixture
of publicly available data and a con￿dential survey conducted by the BEA on the activities
of the U.S. a¢ liates of foreign ￿rms. Aggregate bilateral trade volumes in manufactures and
aggregate domestic manufacturing sales were collected from Feenstra, Romalis, and Schott
(2002) and the Census of Manufacturing respectively. From these aggregates we subtracted the
total contribution of foreign ￿rms to these sales using the BEA data set.
The data for the unrestricted sample (
P
i Xiln) were also constructed using data from sev-
eral sources. The bilateral trade data (l 6= n) came Feenstra, Romalis, and Schott (2002) for
the year 1999. The domestic production data (l = n) was collected from the OECD for most
developed countries, from the INSTAT database maintained by UNIDO for many of the devel-
oping countries, and for a few additional countries the domestic absorption data was obtained
from the estimates found in Simonovska and Waugh (2009). In the estimation we use only
21These countries are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Finland, Germany, Greece, Luxembourg, Ireland,
Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and Sweden.
22The BEA data for a¢ liate exports contains information on the destination for only these four countries and
for seven regions in total. Of these regions, only the European countries share a common tari⁄.
40those bilateral pair observations for which both Xiln and Xln are both nonzero and non-missing
yielding a sample size of 316.
The data for trade frictions was drawn from several sources. The tari⁄ levels (tln) are the
simple average of tari⁄line data where the tari⁄s are those applied to various country groupings.
The raw tari⁄ data was obtained from either the WTO or from the WITS web-site maintained
by the World Bank. Tari⁄s applied by a given country n can di⁄er from their MFN levels
across exporting countries l either because no tari⁄ is applied, as when n = l or n and l are
both in a free trade agreement or customs union, or because country n extends GSP tari⁄s to
a developing country l. Data for distance (dln) and for the standard gravity controls (Hln) are
from the CEPII web-site. To allow for non-linearities in the e⁄ect of distance on trade cost,
we constructed six categorical variables (D1 through D6) de￿ned by the size of the distance.23
Finally, a dummy variable was included that takes a value of one for the case in which l = n
and a value of zero for the case l 6= n.
B Theory Appendix
B.1 Proof of Lemma 1
The (unconditional) probability that a ￿rm from i will serve market n from l is
Pr
￿
argmin
k
Cikn = l \ min
k
Cikn ￿ c
￿
n
￿
:
To compute this probability, note that,
Pr(Ci1n ￿ ci1n;:::;CiNn ￿ ciNn) = Pr
￿
Z1 ￿
￿i1n
ci1n
;:::;ZN ￿
￿iNn
ciNn
￿
:
Assuming that cikn ￿ ￿ikn e T
￿1=￿
i for all k, then our assumption regarding the distribution of z
for ￿rms in country i implies that
Pr
￿
Z1 ￿
￿i1n
ci1n
;:::;ZN ￿
￿iNn
ciNn
￿
= 1 ￿
0
@
N X
k=1
"
Tik
￿
￿ikn
cikn
￿￿￿# 1
1￿￿
1
A
(1￿￿)
: (32)
But we know that
Pr(Ci1n ￿ ci1n;:::;Ciln = ciln;:::;CiNn ￿ ciNn) = ￿
@ Pr(Ci1n ￿ ci1n;:::;Ciln = ciln;:::;CiNn ￿ ciNn)
@ciln
;
23The categories are less than 1,000km, between 1,000 and 3,000km, between 3000 and 6000km, between 6000
and 9000km, between 9,000 and 12,000km, and greater than 12,000 km.
41hence from (32) we get
Pr(Ci1n ￿ ci1n;:::;Ciln = ciln;:::;CiNn ￿ ciNn) = ￿
0
@
N X
k=1
"
Tik
￿
￿ikn
cikn
￿￿￿# 1
1￿￿
1
A
￿￿
￿
Til￿
￿￿
iln
￿ 1
1￿￿ c
￿=(1￿￿)￿1
iln :
Noting that
Pr
￿
argmin
k
Cikn = l \ min
k
Cikn = c
￿
= Pr(Ci1n ￿ c;:::;Ciln = c;:::;CiNn ￿ c);
and letting ￿in ￿
hP
k
￿
Tik￿
￿￿
ikn
￿ 1
1￿￿
i1￿￿
we conclude that if c < ￿ikn e T
￿1=￿
i for all k then
Pr
￿
argmin
k
Cikn = l \ min
k
Cikn = c
￿
= ￿￿
￿
￿
1￿￿
in
￿
Til￿
￿￿
iln
￿ 1
1￿￿ c
￿￿1 =  iln￿in￿c
￿￿1;
where  iln ￿
￿
Til￿
￿￿
iln=￿in
￿ 1
1￿￿. Given Assumption 1 we know that c￿
in < ￿ikn e T
￿1=￿
i so we can
integrate over c from 0 to c￿
n to show that the probability that ￿rms from i serving market n
will choose location l for production is
Pr
￿
argmin
k
Cikn = l \ min
k
Cikn ￿ c
￿
in
￿
=  iln￿in (c
￿
in)
￿ : (33)
while
Pr
￿
min
k
Cikn ￿ c
￿
n
￿
=
X
k
 ikn￿in (c
￿)
￿ ;
hence
Pr
￿
argmin
k
Cikn = l j min
k
Cikn ￿ c
￿
n
￿
=  iln:
QED
B.2 Derivations of formulas 7 and 8.
Multiplying (33) by the measure of ￿rms in i, Mi, and using (4), we get the measure of ￿rms
from i that serve market n from location l,
Miln = Mi iln￿in
￿
￿wnFn
Xn
￿￿￿=(￿￿1) P ￿
n
e ￿
￿ . (34)
Since the sales of a ￿rm with cost c in a market n are e ￿
1￿￿XnP ￿￿1
n c1￿￿, the result in (5) implies
that total sales from n to l by ￿rms from i, Xiln, are
Xiln = Mi iln￿ine ￿
1￿￿XnP
￿￿1
n
Z c￿
n
0
￿c
￿￿￿dc:
Solving for the integral, using (4) and simplifying yields
Xiln =
e ￿
￿￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿ + 1
Mi iln￿in (￿wnFn)
(￿￿￿+1)=(1￿￿) X
￿=(￿￿1)
n P
￿
n: (35)
Xiln
Miln
=
e ￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿+1Mi iln￿in (￿wnFn)
(￿￿￿+1)=(1￿￿) X
￿=(￿￿1)
n P ￿
n
Mi iln￿in
￿
￿wnFn
e ￿1￿￿Xn
￿￿￿=(￿￿1)
P ￿
n
=
￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿ + 1
wnFn
42In turn, the formula for the price index in (1) together with the pricing rule in (3), the density
in (5), and the cut-o⁄ in (4) imply that
P
￿￿
n = ￿
￿
￿
wnFn
Xn
￿(￿￿￿+1)=(1￿￿) X
k
Mk￿kn: (36)
where ￿ ￿
￿
e ￿1￿￿￿
￿￿￿+1
￿1=￿ ￿
￿
e ￿1￿￿
￿ ￿￿1￿￿
￿(￿￿1). Plugging this result into (34) and (35), we get (7) and
Xiln =
Mi￿in P
k Mk￿kn
 ilnXn,
respectively. De￿ning ￿
E
in ￿
P
l Xiln=Xn, then this last expression implies that
￿
E
in =
Mi￿in P
k Mk￿kn
;
so we ￿nally establish (8).
B.3 Proof of Proposition 1
Using the equilibrium conditions for the case of free entry and setting ￿ln = 1 and ￿il = 1 for
all i;l;n, we get that
￿in = T
e
i
"
X
k
￿
T
p
kw
￿￿
k
￿ 1
1￿￿
#1￿￿
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and  iln =
￿
T e
i T
p
l w
￿￿
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￿ 1
1￿￿ ; hence
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T
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￿
T
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l w
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l
￿1=(1￿￿)
P
k
￿
T
p
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￿￿
k
￿1=(1￿￿) .
These expressions imply that the labor-market clearing and zero-pro￿t conditions (i.e., equations
(19) and (20)) can be written as
1
e ￿
￿
T
p
i w
￿￿
i
￿1=(1￿￿)
P
k
￿
T
p
kw
￿￿
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￿1=(1￿￿)W + wiMif
e
i = wiLi.
￿
1 ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ + 1
￿￿
￿
; (38)
and
￿
MiT e
i P
k MkT e
k
W = Miwif
e
i ; (39)
respectively, where W ￿
P
j wjLj. This last equation implies that
wi = ￿
T e
i =fe
i P
k MkT e
k
W: (40)
Assuming that fe
i = fe for all i and recalling that Mife
i = Le
i, combining (38), (39), and (40)
yields
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Li.
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43But 1 ￿ ￿￿￿+1
￿￿ = ￿ + 1=e ￿, so letting Ai ￿ (T
p
i )
1=(1￿￿) =Li implies
ri =
1
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1 ￿
fe
￿
Ai=(T e
i )
￿=(1￿￿)
P
k AkLk=
￿
T e
j
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P
j MjT e
j
T e
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Finally, notice that by the de￿nition of ri we have Mi = riLi=fe, which can be substituted in
(41) to construct the term
P
k MkT e
k, which equals to
X
k
MkT
e
k = ￿
P
k LkT e
k
fe .
Replacing back in (41) and de￿ning ￿i ￿ LiT e
i =
P
k LkT e
k we ￿nally obtain (26) and the necessary
and su¢ cient condition for this expression to hold, as indicated in the proposition.
B.4 Proof of Proposition 2
Part i) First, as a preliminary result, we establish that ￿ w ￿ w1=w2 > 1, if L1 > L2. The
absence of trade costs implies that ￿
E
in ￿ ￿
E
i for any i;n. (For future reference, note that this
implies that ￿
E
1 +￿
E
2 = ￿
E
11 +￿
E
21 = 1.) This result also implies that ￿in ￿ ￿i for any i;n. The
zero-pro￿t condition, equation (20), implies
L
e
1 = ￿￿
E
1 (L1 + L2= ￿ w), (42)
L
e
2= ￿ w = ￿￿
E
2 (L1 + L2= ￿ w): (43)
Using these equations together with
￿
E
i =
Mi￿in P
k Mk￿kn
=
Mi￿i P
k Mk￿k
and M1fe = Le
1, we then have ￿ w = ￿1=￿2.
Letting ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿=(1￿￿), and using the de￿nition of ￿in and the assumption of A1 = A2 we
can obtain after some derivations
L1
L2
= ￿ w
￿
1￿￿ ￿ w1=(1￿￿) ￿ ￿
1 ￿ ￿ ￿ w1=(1￿￿) . (44)
The RHS of this equation is increasing in ￿ w which implies that ￿ w is increasing in L1=L2. Since
L1=L2 = 1 implies ￿ w = 1, then L1=L2 > 1 implies ￿ w > 1, which proves the preliminary result.
Second, using this result we can now prove that if L1 > L2 then r1 > r2. The proof is
by contradiction. Suppose that r1 < r2. From the labor market clearing condition (19) and
equation (21) and ￿
T
in = ￿
T
i ￿ ￿
T
ii and W ￿
P
k wkLk, we have in country i
wiL
e
i = wiLi.
￿
1 ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ + 1
￿￿
￿
￿
1
e ￿
￿
T
i W =)
ri = ￿ + 1 ￿ 1=￿ ￿
1
e ￿
￿
T
i W
wiLi.
44If r1 < r2 then labor market clearing in the two countries requires
￿
T
1
w1L1
>
￿
T
2
w2L2
(45)
Using the expression for ￿
T
l , the result ￿
E
in = ￿
E
i , and equations (42) and (43), after some
derivations we obtain
L1r1 + L2r2￿ ￿ w
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1￿￿ > ￿ w
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1
1￿￿
￿
:
From the de￿nition of the trade shares we have ￿
T
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E
1 + 21￿
E
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E
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2
where  iln =  il ￿ T
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where the last line uses the fact that ￿
E
i = Mi￿i=
P
j Mj￿j. Dividing by ￿
￿￿=(1￿￿)
1 and using
the above result that ￿ w = ￿1=￿2 we see that this inequality is equivalent to
￿
r1L1 + ￿r2L2 ￿ w
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> ￿ w
￿=(1￿￿) ￿
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where in the last inequality we used Mi = riLi=fe.
Rearranging this expression, we obtain
L2r2 ￿ w
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> L1r1
￿
￿ w
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￿
,
which will ￿nally allow us to prove the result by contradiction.Note that when L1 > L2 we
have ￿ w > 1, so that the term in parentheses on the left-hand-side of this inequality is nega-
tive. If ￿ w￿=(1￿￿)+1￿ ￿ 1, then the inequality must be violated and the desired contradiction
is shown. Alternatively, if ￿ w￿=(1￿￿)+1￿ < 1 we can use (44) and the inequality to arrive to an
expression that contradicts the initial assertion that r1 < r2. Thus, since this assertion leads in
contradiction in all cases, we conclude that r1 > r2 which completes the proof of part i).
Part ii) To simplify the notation, without of loss of generality we assume that T e
1 = T e
2 = 1
and use Ti as shorthand for T
p
i . Frictionless MP implies that ￿in = ￿n for any i;j;n and
￿
E
ij = Mi=(M1 + M2) for any i;j. The labor market clearing in production is given by (17),
which in this case implies
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￿
:
But given the absence of MP costs and the implication that ￿in = ￿n for any i, then this
equation can be rewritten as
w1L
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i
:
In an interior solution (de￿ned as a situation in which both countries innovate) we must have
45w1 = w2 or else the lower wage country would be the only to innovate. We normalize this
wage to one. Using the de￿nition of ￿in, and given the assumption Ai ￿ T
1=(1￿￿)
i =Li we have
￿in =
hP
k AkLk￿
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kn
i1￿￿
and hence
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Finally, using symmetry A1 = A2 = A and letting t ￿ ￿￿￿=(1￿￿) and l1 ￿ L1=(L1 + L2) we get
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:
and similarly for the second country. Noting that ri = 1 ￿ L
p
i=Li, we have
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￿
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￿
It is clear from these expressions that for any l1 2 (1=2;1) that r1 < ￿ and r2 > ￿.
QED.
B.5 Real Wage in Terms of Flows.
We prove the following two lemmas that characterize the real wage and real expenditure under
exogenous and endogenous entry.
Lemma 2 Under exogenous entry, real wages are given by,
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= ￿n (T
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nMn)
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(46)
and real expenditure is given by
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;
where ￿n ￿ ￿ (Fn=Ln)
￿￿1￿￿
￿(￿￿1).
Proof. We start with ￿
T
ln =
P
i  iln￿
E
in and the de￿nitions of  iln and ￿iln to show that
￿
T
ln =
X
k
￿
Tkl￿
￿￿
kln
￿kn
￿ 1
1￿￿
￿
E
in = (wl￿ln)
￿ ￿
1￿￿
X
k
￿
Tkl￿
￿￿
kl
￿kn
￿ 1
1￿￿
￿
E
kn
so
wn =
"
￿
T
nn
P
k
￿
Tkn￿
￿￿
kn=￿kn
￿1=(1￿￿)
￿
E
kn
#￿(1￿￿)=￿
:
Using the result for the Dixit-Stiglitz price index in (36), using ￿ ￿
￿
e ￿1￿￿￿
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E
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P
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P
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E
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:
46Combining the two previous expressions and using Tin = T e
i T p
n we get
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Using Xiln =  iln￿
E
inXn and  iln ￿
￿
Til￿
￿￿
iln=￿in
￿ 1
1￿￿ and simplifying we get
X
k
￿
T
e
k￿
￿￿
kn
￿nn
￿kn
￿ 1
1￿￿
￿
E
in =
(T e
n)
1
1￿￿ ￿
E
nn
Xnnn=
P
i Xinn
:
Plugging this into (47), and using the de￿nitions of ￿
T
nn, ￿
E
nn, we get that the real wage is given
by
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Under restricted entry, the labor market clearing condition is given by (13), which implies
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1
e ￿
Yl +
￿ ￿ ￿ + 1
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Xl
and thus we can write real wage as
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: (49)
To derive Xn=Pn we simply use (49) and the labor market clearing one more time. This last
step completes the proof. QED
Lemma 3 Under endogenous entry, real wage and real expenditure are given by:
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Pn
=
Xn
Pn
1
Ln
= ￿n (T
e
nT
p
nMn)
1=￿
￿
Xnnn
Xn
￿￿
1￿￿
￿ ￿P
l Xnln
Xn
￿￿
￿
￿
. (50)
Proof. This follows immediately from imposing Xn = wnLn in (48). QED
B.6 Proof of Proposition 3
Since T e
i = 1 then mi = Mi=Li for all i. The assumption that Ai = 1 for all i implies that
Tii = T
p
i = L
1￿￿
i . Let m ￿
P
Mj=
P
Lj, let Wi be the real wage in country i under frictionless
trade and in￿nite MP costs and let W ￿
i be the real wage in country i under frictionless trade
and frictionless MP and de￿ne li = Li=
P
k Lk. We ￿rst need to characterize the expressions for
welfare under restricted entry which is done in the following Lemma.
Lemma 4 Under restricted entry, consider a world where T e
i = (T
p
i )
1=(1￿￿) =Li = 1; 8i and
assume ￿ ! 1 and that mi ￿ li
(￿+1)(￿￿￿￿+1)
(￿￿￿+1) for all i. The ratio of the real wage under frictionless
trade and in￿nite MP costs to the real wage under free trade and no MP costs, W ￿
i =Wi, is given
by the expression:
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(51)
47Proof. See online Appendix
With the help of this Lemma we can now proceed to prove the two parts of the proposition:
Part i) We ￿rst show that real wages increase i⁄ ￿ < ￿ ￿ ￿
(1+￿)2
1+￿+￿2. To do that we will use
the above lemma where we also need to solve for Xn=Yn. We have shown that (1 ￿ ￿)
P
l Xl =
P
l Ll ￿ L so that using (79) given that ￿
E
i = Mi=M we obtain
Xn =
Ln
1 ￿ ￿
￿
1 ￿ ￿ + ￿
Mn=Ln
M=L
￿
=)
Xn=Yn = 1 ￿ ￿ + ￿
mn
m
. (52)
Substituting into (51) and rearranging we get
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where ￿ ￿ ￿=(￿ ￿ 1) ￿ 1. Rearranging this expression we get
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￿ m1￿￿
m
￿=(1+￿)
i
P
k m
1=(1+￿)
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(54)
Taking logs of the expression and di⁄erentiating w.r.t. to the size of one country mi and
evaluating at symmetry, mj = m for all j, we get that the sign of this derivative is determined
by
￿ [(1 ￿ ￿)li + ￿] + (1 ￿ ￿)li ￿
￿
1 + ￿
￿
1
1 + ￿
li
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￿
1 + ￿
:
The condition ￿￿ > ￿
1+￿ is equivalent to ￿ >
(1+￿)2
1+￿+￿2 ￿ ￿ ￿, which proves part i).
Part ii) Now consider real expenditures. With no MP we have
xi =
!i
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;
whereas with frictionless trade and MP we have
x
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:
Using (52) we then get
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:
48This expression is similar to what we had above for real wages, only that instead of ￿ we now
have ￿ + ￿. Thus, the condition for real income to fall is that (￿ + ￿)￿ < ￿
1+￿. Notice however
that this condition is equivalent to ￿￿1 > ￿, which can never be true since we require ￿ > ￿￿1
for the various integrals to have a ￿nite mean. Thus, real expenditure must increase with MP.
What happens to real pro￿ts? Pro￿ts in country i are ￿i = Xi ￿ wiLi, so real pro￿ts per
person of country i are ￿i = xi￿!i. With frictionless trade and no MP we have xi = !i=(1 ￿ ￿),
so ￿i = !i
￿
1
1￿￿ ￿ 1
￿
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￿!i
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:
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:
Taking logs, di⁄erentiating, and evaluating at symmetry we get
1
m
(1 ￿ li)
￿
￿￿ +
1
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￿
;
which is always positive. QED
B.7 Proof of Proposition 4
To prove proposition 4 we will ￿rst compute the real wage for two scenarios: (i) frictionless
trade but no MP and (ii) frictionless trade with frictionless MP. Then we will compare the two.
(i) Frictionless trade but no MP. Given that there is no MP, trade is balanced so that
Xi = Yi and Le
i = ￿Li for all i. Therefore the current account balance equation (16) together
with (21) and Le
i = ￿Li implies wiLi =
P
n ￿
E
inXn: But since there is frictionless trade but no
MP, then we also have
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E
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p
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k
:
The current account balance can then be written as
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Choosing country N labor as the numeraire, and using Mi = riLi=fe
i with ri = ￿, wages are
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49Also, note that by using (55) and
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Finally, using the above relationship, and Xn = wnLn inside the price index, given by equation
(36), and equation (55) we ￿nally obtain the real wage
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(ii) Frictionless trade and frictionless MP. From (40) and wN = 1 we get
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The zero pro￿t condition in this case is equation (39) so that
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The above equation, together with equation (37), inside the price index, equation (36), imply
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Comparison of the welfare with without MP and with free MP To prove our result
we need to compare the welfare in the two cases, and thus we need to prove  
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Note ￿rst that the RHS of this expression is less or equal than maxk T
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. Then given
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which holds always true.
51C Additional Appendix (not for the PDF)
C.1 Main Text
AddNoteText1 *** Algebra: Using (12); (8) we have
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52C.2 Appendix
AddNoteApp1*** Algebra, to be removed:
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<
Ai=(T e
l )
￿=(1￿￿)+1
P
j ￿jAj=
￿
T e
j
￿￿=(1￿￿)+1 < 1 + ￿
￿
￿ ￿ 1
53comes from
0 <
￿ ￿ 1
￿
 
1 ￿
Ai=(T e
l )
￿=(1￿￿)+1
P
j ￿jAj=
￿
T e
j
￿￿=(1￿￿)+1
!
+ ￿ < 1
￿￿
￿
￿ ￿ 1
< 1 ￿
Ai=(T e
l )
￿=(1￿￿)+1
P
j ￿jAj=
￿
T e
j
￿￿=(1￿￿)+1 < (1 ￿ ￿)
￿
￿ ￿ 1
1 + ￿
￿
￿ ￿ 1
>
Ai=(T e
l )
￿=(1￿￿)+1
P
j ￿jAj=
￿
T e
j
￿￿=(1￿￿)+1 > 1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
￿
￿ ￿ 1
C.3 Proof of Proposition 2
AddNoteApp6*** Algebra, to be removed:
M1f
e = ￿￿
E
1 (L1 + L2= ￿ w)
M2f
e= ￿ w = ￿￿
E
2 (L1 + L2= ￿ w)
M1
M2
￿ w =
￿
E
11
￿
E
22
=
M1￿1
M2￿2
AddNoteApp7*** Algebra, to be removed: using ￿iv =
hP
v
￿
Tiv￿
￿￿
ivn
￿ 1
1￿￿
i1￿￿
and the assump-
tions in the proposition we get
￿1
￿2
=
￿
P
v
￿
T eT p
v (￿1vwv)
￿￿
￿ 1
1￿￿
￿1￿￿
￿
P
v
￿
T eT
p
v (￿2vwv)
￿￿
￿ 1
1￿￿
￿1￿￿
AddNoteApp8*** Algebra, to be removed: We have
￿ w =
 
(T
p
1)
1=(1￿￿) + (T
p
2)
1=(1￿￿) ￿ ￿ w￿=(1￿￿)
(T
p
1)
1=(1￿￿) ￿ + (T
p
2)
1=(1￿￿) ￿ w￿=(1￿￿)
!1￿￿
.
A1 = A2 implies that
￿ w =
￿
L1 + L2￿ ￿ w￿=(1￿￿)
L1￿ + L2 ￿ w￿=(1￿￿)
￿1￿￿
￿ w
1=(1￿￿) ￿
L1￿ + L2 ￿ w
￿=(1￿￿)￿
= L1 + L2￿ ￿ w
￿=(1￿￿)
L2 ￿ w
￿=(1￿￿) ￿
￿ w
1=(1￿￿) ￿ ￿
￿
= L1
￿
1 ￿ ￿ ￿ w
1=(1￿￿)￿
￿ w￿=(1￿￿) ￿
￿ w1=(1￿￿) ￿ ￿
￿
1 ￿ ￿ ￿ w1=(1￿￿) =
L1
L2
AddNoteApp9*** Algebra: We have ￿
T
ln =
P
i  iln￿
E
in with
 iln =  il ￿
￿
Til￿
￿￿
iln
￿in
￿ 1
1￿￿
=
￿
T eT
p
l (￿ilwl)
￿￿
￿1=(1￿￿)
P
v
￿
T eT
p
v (￿ivwv)
￿￿
￿1=(1￿￿) =
T
1=(1￿￿)
e Ll (￿ilwl)
￿￿=(1￿￿)
(￿i)
1=(1￿￿)
54Since
￿
T
1 =  11￿
E
1 +  21￿
E
2
￿
T
2 =  12￿
E
1 +  22￿
E
2
then (45) implies
 11￿
E
1 +  21￿
E
2
w1L1
>
 12￿
E
1 +  22￿
E
2
w2L2
L1w
￿￿=(1￿￿)
1
￿
E
1 ￿
￿1=(1￿￿)
1 + ￿￿
E
2 ￿
￿1=(1￿￿)
2
w1L1
> L2w
￿￿=(1￿￿)
2
￿￿
E
1 ￿
￿1=(1￿￿)
1 + ￿
E
2 ￿
￿1=(1￿￿)
2
w2L2
w
￿￿=(1￿￿)￿1
1
￿
￿
E
1 ￿
￿1=(1￿￿)
1 + ￿￿
E
2 ￿
￿1=(1￿￿)
2
￿
> w
￿￿=(1￿￿)￿1
2
￿
￿￿
E
1 ￿
￿1=(1￿￿)
1 + ￿
E
2 ￿
￿1=(1￿￿)
2
￿
w
￿￿=(1￿￿)￿1
1
￿
M1￿
￿￿=(1￿￿)
1 + ￿M2￿
￿￿=(1￿￿)
2
￿
> w
￿￿=(1￿￿)￿1
2
￿
￿M1￿
￿￿=(1￿￿)
1 + M2￿
￿￿=(1￿￿)
2
￿
AddNoteApp9b*** Note that when L1 > L2 we have ￿ w > 1, so that the term in parentheses
on left-hand-side of this inequality is negative. If ￿ w￿=(1￿￿)+1￿ ￿ 1, then the inequality must
be violated and the desired contradiction is shown. Alternatively, if ￿ w￿=(1￿￿)+1￿ < 1 then the
above inequality implies that
r1
r2
>
L2 ￿ w
￿
1￿￿
￿
￿ w￿=(1￿￿)+1 ￿ ￿
￿
L1 (1 ￿ ￿ ￿ w￿=(1￿￿)+1)
: (58)
But using (44) then we have that
L2 ￿ w
￿
1￿￿
￿
￿ w￿=(1￿￿)+1 ￿ ￿
￿
L1 (1 ￿ ￿ ￿ w￿=(1￿￿)+1)
=
￿ w
1
1￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ w
￿
￿￿￿
1￿￿
￿ w1=(1￿￿) ￿ ￿
1 ￿ ￿ ￿ w1=(1￿￿)
1 ￿ ￿ ￿ w￿=(1￿￿)+1
But given assumption ￿ > 1, then ￿ w > 1 implies that ￿ w
￿
￿￿￿
1￿￿ < 1 and ￿ w￿=(1￿￿)+1 < ￿ w1=(1￿￿), so
both fractions on the RHS are higher than one, which implies
L2 ￿ w
￿
1￿￿
￿
￿ w￿=(1￿￿)+1 ￿ ￿
￿
L1 (1 ￿ ￿ ￿ w￿=(1￿￿)+1)
> 1:
AddNoteApp10*** Algebra: *** Algebra:
L
p
1
L1
=
￿ ￿ ￿ + 1
￿￿
+
￿ ￿ 1
￿
A
￿
L1
AL1 + AL2t
+
tL2
AL1t + AL2
￿
=
￿ ￿ ￿ + 1
￿￿
+
￿ ￿ 1
￿
￿
l1
l1 + (1 ￿ l1)t
+
t(1 ￿ l1)
l1t + (1 ￿ l1)
￿
Repeating this algebra for country 2 yields
L
p
2
L2
=
￿ ￿ ￿ + 1
￿￿
+
￿ ￿ 1
￿
￿
tl1
l1 + (1 ￿ l1)t
+
(1 ￿ l1)
l1t + (1 ￿ l1)
￿
C.4 Real Wages
AddNoteApp10b*** The labor market clearing condition under restricted entry gives
55wlLl =
￿
￿ ￿ 1
￿
￿
Yl +
￿ ￿ ￿ + 1
￿￿
Xl =)
wlLl
Xl
=
￿￿
￿ ￿ 1
￿
￿
Yl
Xl
+
￿ ￿ ￿ + 1
￿￿
￿
=)
so that
wn
Pn
= ￿ (T
e
nT
p
nMn)
1=￿
￿
Xnnn
Xn
￿￿
1￿￿
￿ ￿P
l Xnln
Xn
￿￿
￿
￿ ￿￿￿
￿ ￿ 1
￿
￿
Yn
Xn
+
￿ ￿ ￿ + 1
￿￿
￿
Fn
Ln
￿ ￿￿1￿￿
￿(￿￿1)
=
￿
Fn
Ln
￿ ￿￿1￿￿
￿(￿￿1)
￿ (T
e
nT
p
nMn)
1=￿
￿
Xnnn
Xn
￿￿
1￿￿
￿ ￿P
l Xnln
Xn
￿￿
￿
￿ ￿￿
￿ ￿ 1
￿
￿
Yn
Xn
+
￿ ￿ ￿ + 1
￿￿
￿ ￿￿1￿￿
￿(￿￿1)
and also
Xn
wnLn
wn
Pn
=
Xn
wnLn
￿ (T
e
nT
p
nMn)
1=￿
￿
Xnnn
Xn
￿￿
1￿￿
￿ ￿P
l Xnln
Xn
￿￿
￿
￿ ￿
wnFn
Xn
￿ ￿￿1￿￿
￿(￿￿1)
=
￿￿
￿ ￿ 1
￿
￿
Yn
Xn
+
￿ ￿ ￿ + 1
￿￿
￿￿1
￿ (T
e
nT
p
nMn)
1=￿
￿
Xnnn
Xn
￿￿
1￿￿
￿ ￿P
l Xnln
Xn
￿￿
￿
￿ ￿￿￿
￿ ￿ 1
￿
￿
Yn
Xn
+
￿ ￿ ￿ + 1
￿￿
￿
Fn
Ln
￿ ￿￿1￿￿
￿(￿￿1)
=
￿
Fn
Ln
￿ ￿￿1￿￿
￿(￿￿1)
￿ (T
e
nT
p
nMn)
1=￿
￿
Xnnn
Xn
￿￿
1￿￿
￿ ￿P
l Xnln
Xn
￿￿
￿
￿ ￿￿
￿ ￿ 1
￿
￿
Yn
Xn
+
￿ ￿ ￿ + 1
￿￿
￿ ￿￿1￿￿
￿(￿￿1)￿1
AddNoteApp10c***
Xi
￿
1 ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ + 1
￿￿
￿
=
￿
￿ ￿ 1
￿
￿
Yi + ￿
X
n
￿
E
inXn =)
￿ ￿ 1 + ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿
E
i
P
n Xn
Xi
= (￿ ￿ 1)
Yi
Xi
=)
￿ ￿ 1 + ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿
E
i
P
n Xn
Xi
1 ￿ ￿￿
=
￿ ￿ 1
1 ￿ ￿￿
Yi
Xi
￿￿￿￿￿E
i
P
n Xn
Xi
1￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿
1￿￿￿
=
￿￿1
￿
Yn
Xn + ￿￿￿+1
￿￿
1 ￿ ￿
1 ￿ ￿￿
E
i
P
n Xn
Xi
1 ￿ ￿
=
￿￿1
￿
Yn
Xn + ￿￿￿+1
￿￿
1 ￿ ￿
AddNoteApp10d*** Thus, we ￿nally have
56W
￿
n=Wn =
m
1
￿
￿
￿￿1
1￿￿￿
Yn
Xn + 1
￿ ￿￿1￿￿
￿(￿￿1)
￿
￿￿￿￿
1￿￿￿
￿ ￿￿1￿￿
￿￿1
(mn)
1=(1+￿)
￿P
j m
1=(1+￿)
j lj
￿ 1
￿
=
m
1
￿
￿
m
(1￿￿)m+￿mi
￿ ￿￿1￿￿
￿(￿￿1)
(mn)
1=(1+￿)
￿P
j m
1=(1+￿)
j lj
￿ 1
￿
(W
￿
n=Wn)
￿ =
m
￿
m
(1￿￿)m+￿mi
￿ ￿￿1￿￿
(￿￿1)
(mn)
￿=(1+￿)
￿P
j m
1=(1+￿)
j lj
￿
￿ ￿ ￿=(￿ ￿ 1) ￿ 1
(W
￿
n=Wn)
￿ =
(m)
1￿￿ ((1 ￿ ￿)m + ￿mn)
￿
(mn)
￿=(1+￿)
￿P
j m
1=(1+￿)
j lj
￿
AddNoteApp11*** Algebra, to be removed:
Pn = ￿
￿1
"￿
wnFn
Xn
￿(￿￿￿+1)=(1￿￿) X
i
Mi￿in
#￿1=￿
= ￿
￿1
 ￿
wnFn
Xn
￿(￿￿￿+1)=(1￿￿) Mn￿nn
￿
E
nn
!￿1=￿
Combining the two previous expressions and using Tin = T e
i T p
n we get
wn
Pn
= ￿ (T
p
nMn)
1=￿ ￿
￿
T
nn
￿ ￿￿1
￿ ￿
￿
E
nn
￿￿ 1
￿
"
X
i
￿
T
e
i ￿
￿￿
in
￿nn
￿in
￿ 1
1￿￿
￿
E
in
# 1￿￿
￿ ￿
wnFn
Xn
￿ ￿￿1￿￿
￿(￿￿1)
: (59)
Notice that with Free entry we have
Xn
Ln
1
Pn
=
￿
Fn
Ln
￿ ￿￿1￿￿
￿(￿￿1)
￿ (T
p
nMn)
1=￿ ￿
￿
T
nn
￿ ￿￿1
￿ ￿
￿
E
nn
￿￿ 1
￿
"
X
i
￿
T
e
i ￿
￿￿
in
￿nn
￿in
￿ 1
1￿￿
￿
E
in
# 1￿￿
￿
AddNoteApp12*** Algebra, to be removed:
wn
Pn
= ￿
"￿
wnFn
Xn
￿1￿￿=(￿￿1) Mn￿nn
￿
E
nn
#1=￿ "
￿
T
nn
P
i
￿
Tin￿
￿￿
in =￿in
￿1=(1￿￿)
￿
E
in
#￿(1￿￿)=￿
= ￿
￿
￿
T
nn
￿￿(1￿￿)=￿ ￿
￿
E
nn
￿￿1=￿
[Mn￿nn]
1=￿
"
X
i
￿
T
e
i T
p
n￿
￿￿
in =￿in
￿1=(1￿￿)
￿
E
in
#(1￿￿)=￿ ￿
wnFn
Xn
￿ ￿￿1￿￿
￿(￿￿1)
= ￿
￿
￿
T
nn
￿￿(1￿￿)=￿ ￿
￿
E
nn
￿￿1=￿
[T
p
nMn]
1=￿
"
(￿nn)
1=(1￿￿) X
i
￿
T
e
i ￿
￿￿
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￿
E
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wnFn
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￿ ￿￿1￿￿
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57Using Xiln =  iln￿
E
inXn and  iln ￿
￿
Til￿
￿￿
iln=￿in
￿ 1
1￿￿ and simplifying we get
X
i
￿
T
e
i ￿
￿￿
in
￿nn
￿in
￿ 1
1￿￿
￿
E
in =
(T e
n)
1
1￿￿ ￿
E
nn
Xnnn=
P
i Xinn
:
AddNoteApp13*** Algebra, to be removed:
Xnnn P
i Xinn
=
 nnn￿
E
nnXn P
i  inn￿
E
inXn
=
￿
T e
nT p
n￿
￿￿
nnn=￿nn
￿ 1
1￿￿ ￿
E
nn
P
i
￿
T e
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p
n￿
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E
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1￿￿ ￿
E
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P
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￿
T e
i ￿
￿￿
in =￿in
￿ 1
1￿￿ ￿
E
in
;
Plugging this into (47), and using the de￿nitions of ￿
T
nn, ￿
E
nn, we get that the real wage is given
by
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Pn
= ￿ (T
e
nT
p
nMn)
1=￿
￿
Xnnn
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￿￿
1￿￿
￿ ￿P
l Xnln
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￿￿
￿
￿ ￿
wnFn
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￿ ￿￿1￿￿
￿(￿￿1)
: (60)
AddNoteApp14*** Algebra, to be removed:
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p
nMn)
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nn
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￿ ￿
￿
E
nn
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AddNoteApp15*** Algebra, to be removed: We start with
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￿
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￿ ￿￿1￿￿
￿(￿￿1)
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nMn)
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1￿￿
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￿￿1
￿ Yn + ￿￿￿+1
￿￿ Xn
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! ￿￿1￿￿
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and note that
￿￿1
￿ Yn + ￿￿￿+1
￿￿ Xn
Xn
=
￿ ￿ ￿ + 1
￿￿
￿
￿ ￿ 1
￿
￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿ + 1
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Xn
+ 1
￿
But 1 ￿ ￿￿￿+1
￿￿ = ￿ + 1 ￿ 1=￿, so ￿￿￿+1
￿￿ = 1=￿ ￿ ￿, and hence
wn
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R
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p
nMn)
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￿ ￿
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￿(￿￿1)
To derive Xn=Pn we simply use (49) and the labor market clearing one more time.
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*** Costas: this is not the same as what we have above in the lemma... did I make a mistake
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Finally, we obtain
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#
:
(61)
where ￿ is an indicator
AddNoteApp18**********The only questionable point of the proof is whether we can take
(or maybe under which conditions) the limit ￿ ! 1. Below in between the *** there is a serious
e⁄ort to show that but not yet completed, the rest of the proof works as below***
AddNoteApp19********** Let￿ s construct an equilibrium for the limit ￿ ! 1. Notice that
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AddNoteApp20****for ￿ ! 1 we have that the expression (75) becomes
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Using M ￿
P
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C.5 Proof of Proposition 4
AddNoteApp21b*******we derive real wage as
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60D Online Appendix
Lemma 4 Under restricted entry, consider a world where T e
i = (T
p
i )
1=(1￿￿) =Li = 1; 8i and
where mi ￿ li
(￿+1)(￿￿￿￿+1)
(￿￿￿+1) 8i and assume ￿ ! 1 for all i. The ratio of the real wage under
frictionless trade and in￿nite MP costs to the real wage under free trade and no MP costs,
W ￿
i =Wi, is given by the expression:
W ￿
i
Wi
=
m
1
￿
￿
m
(1￿￿)m+￿mi
￿ ￿￿1￿￿
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j lj
￿ 1
￿
(63)
Proof. Since we focus on frictionless trade, imposing T e
i = 1 we have
￿in =
"
X
k
￿
T
p
k(￿ikwk)
￿￿￿ 1
1￿￿
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 iln =
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i 1
1￿￿
￿  il; (65)
and
￿
E
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Mi￿i P
Mj￿j
￿ ￿
E
i :
Using the de￿nition of ￿
T
ln and imposing free trade we have
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T
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T
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￿
E
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#￿(1￿￿)=￿
:
and given (64) and ￿
E
in = ￿
E
i , we can write this expression as
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"
￿
T
n
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1=(1￿￿) P
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￿
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i
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(66)
we will use this relationship below and consider separately the two cases: in￿nite MP costs and
zero MP costs.
In￿nite MP costs: In this case, we additionally have ￿
T
n = ￿
E
n; and ￿n = T p
nw￿￿
n so that
expression (66) yields
wn =
"
￿
T
n
(T
p
n=￿n)
1=(1￿￿) ￿
E
n
#￿(1￿￿)=￿
,
whereas equation (23) with ￿in = 1 for all i;n and in￿nite MP costs becomes
￿
E
l = ￿
T
l =
MlT
p
l w
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l P
j MjT
p
j w
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j
; (67)
which gives us ￿
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=
￿
T
i
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p
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￿
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p
l = Ll, and no MP implies Xl = Yl, hence (13) implies
wlLl = (1 ￿ ￿)￿
T
l
X
n
Xn;
and hence
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=
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T
l
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￿
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:
Combined with (68) this equation yields
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￿
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Ll
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(69)
Using T
p
i = L
1￿￿
i and setting wn = 1 by choice of numeraire, we then have
wi = (Mn=L
￿
n)
￿1=(1+￿) (Mi=L
￿
i)
1=(1+￿) : (70)
Also, notice that expression (49) gives the real wage under exogenous entry. With no MP
we have Xnln = 0 except for l = n, ￿
T
nn = Xnnn=Xn, and Xn = Yn, so that the expression for
welfare in this case is
Wn = ￿n (1 ￿ ￿)
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￿
But using expression (67), welfare in the case of no MP can be written as
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Now substituting for expression (70) and T
p
i = L
1￿￿
i , performing some simpli￿cations and
considering the limit ￿ ! 1 we obtain
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Zero MP costs: Using (9) and (10) together with the de￿nition of  iln and imposing zero MP
costs we get
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But now we have ￿i = ￿ ￿
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Therefore, relative trade shares can be given by
￿
T
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Using (8) and noting that
P
l Xnln
Xn = ￿
E
nn (from the de￿nition of ￿
E
in) and recalling that ￿
E
nn = ￿
E
n,
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We want to ￿nd the expression for W ￿
n when ￿ ! 1. We ￿rst conjecture that under this
limit wages equalize and we a) derive an expression for the last parenthetical term of the
welfare expression b) show that  n is ￿nite and bounded away from zero c) show that the wage
equalization conjecture is true. Combining these three results the limit of the expression (75)
as ￿ ! 1 is
W
￿
n = ￿nM
1
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a) We ￿rst postulate that wages equalize as ￿ ! 1 and show that
1
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:
From the current account balance condition (16) combined with the labor market clearing
condition (19) we obtain
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Note that
P
k Yk =
P
k Xk combined with the labor market clearing condition implies
P
k wkLk =
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P
k Yk. Combining (77) and (78) and using this result together with ￿
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.
63Using (79) we then get
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If wages are equalized, then the RHS becomes
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b) Now we want to show that under the condition in the proposition in this limit equilibrium
all countries have ,  n > 0. To show that we want to ￿nd the limit
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Thus, we simply need to construct the trade shares in the case of wage equalization with ￿ ! 1.
The equilibrium conditions in a frictionless equilibrium are current account balance,
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and labor market clearing,
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Adding up across the current account balance conditions implies
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Combining current account balance with labor market clearing and using this last result together
witht he expression for ￿
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wjLj = L so then we have
￿
1 ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ + 1
￿￿
Mi
M
+
1
e ￿
1
1 ￿ ￿
liw
￿￿=(1￿￿)
i P
k lkw
￿￿=(1￿￿)
k
=
￿
1 ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ + 1
￿￿
￿
wili (80)
Together with
P
wjLj = L this is a system of N non-linear equations in N unknowns. If wages
are equalized in the limit as ￿ ! 1, then we must have
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which is the condition of the proposition
c) In the last step we want to show that in the limit equilibrium wages are equalized. The
system can be rewritten as
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Assumption (81) is then
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Since maxwv ￿ 1 then, letting j = argmaxv wv, we then have bmaxwv ￿ aj=lj ￿ 0, then (80)
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hence, taking limits of (82) we have
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We have completed the derivations of the two formulas for no MP and frictionless MP. From
65the two formulas (71) and (76) we obtain
W
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with ￿ ￿ ￿=(￿ ￿ 1) ￿ 1. Notice that under symmetry W ￿
n=Wn = 1. Also notice that the
above expression is the same as (54). This last derivation completes the Lemma.
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